sys-auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth: 0.10.3 version bump

Include OpenSSL 1.1.1 support patch
Add -9999 live ebuild
Update metadata to reference github project site

Closes: https://bugs.gentoo.org/669758
Signed-off-by: Craig Andrews <candrews@gentoo.org>
Package-Manager: Portage-2.3.51, Repoman-2.3.11
(cherry picked from commit 1bd6acd801306f1dadb54637f1e838c0c6dad6a5)
Signed-off-by: Robin H. Johnson <robbat2@gentoo.org>

5 files changed, 1345 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/sys-auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth/Manifest b/sys-auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth/Manifest
index 10e261a81047..1b1fdc46d1ce 100644
--- a/sys-auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth/Manifest
+++ b/sys-auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth/Manifest
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 DIST pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2.tar.bz2 246412 BLAKE2B 3adf2bcc76559733f997744c95c660c67010b124db6e811559625a2ad7cbc7339d43d22dd5144135ae36ab90fdeb3c80c887e3157241936ceeb6026c8aa298fe SHA512 b4b9bc4486d873f236f7c54874c996e24f344f889dfda3beadb12b97cbb89078028a103a4a7175cd919fb0a12fd5bcefef50420510ae5eff9252e494e0124b38
+DIST pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3.tar.bz2 1066393 BLAKE2B 07b113d05e09f770d63dbea813ea644199d2b103f9c6d7e5960bfad37cb181ce5a5f111f72e0274c0335e4c217ccd19bd53d61af23f8bc6aff14c1995fc4edc9 SHA512 d75062c4e46b0b011f46aed9704a99049995fea8b5115ff7ee26dad7e93cbcf54a8af7efc6b521109d77dc03c6f5284574d2e1b84c6829cec25610f24fb4bd66
 DIST pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2.tar.bz2 237156 BLAKE2B b9d09920e10b454ea739e44c38daba6a509fbd4a96f01e26a82e0a8c58b696806b1f3ea95d53c10b55ed01e5804dfb687dd4545b87d85fa4f6a474548c3666d5 SHA512 e710a4dff315c8d79c5d5edc4ebe1629a8fc6d09651813fd4792a2021e7c2d5768d6b7e8539801e31b947cc30817f32375d751fc396707fc4f257df4f33cd408
 DIST pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.tar.bz2 239596 BLAKE2B 7be6af1c78457e082d34f5df406fccf74fbda48d1fe87be0592b927ea296b6db3cf1f9a58bcdd61c50556ffc53c16276dc87e5970d9caa0e51fb520e0473240b SHA512 c2304dcf623858339b5fd77bcf64e9c980a3ee241384b9125d64ba6ab9539a65eacbd3576b31a94bb390e4c089e702f9df2963119250b773bd8be872ae63a050
 DIST pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4.tar.bz2 239250 BLAKE2B fee1e009a5374126db0b0df9f05436521e215933ed2eabdcd1983e6372fc7160c6a6c53d07b9ddc7bdd8b9529a27c7da4ef35aad2c80ea1ef2f895f3fb237135 SHA512 3d469e85bf7c49dcf9345c63678ebe050db4d15447592bc337bfc762f2337f92cebd7e840fc12d7be94acf1aa47b0272efe2c1688888ecd8f9daf63549520792
diff --git a/sys-auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth/files/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-openssl-1.1.1.patch b/sys-auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth/files/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-openssl-1.1.1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a422cd5e479f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sys-auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth/files/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-openssl-1.1.1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,1244 @@
+From eef90424a0545b7b0125dfaf5e3cef3c5248ada0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Guido Falsi <mad@madpilot.net>
+Date: Sat, 20 Oct 2018 14:29:43 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Adapt to OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+
+The FreeBSD operating system is migrating to OpenSSL 1.1.1 and I have created this set of patches to make pam_ssh_agent_auth compile with it.
+
+The patch comments out some parts of include files which are not actually used and reference now opaque OpenSSL internals.
+
+I also have migrated the source files to use accessors to use the OpenSSL objects.
+
+The patch works on FreeBSD head (will be 12.0) but the --without-openssl-header-check argument is required in configure there.
+---
+ authfd.c    |  50 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ bufbn.c     |   4 ++
+ cipher.h    |   6 ++-
+ kex.h       |   9 +++-
+ key.c       | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ ssh-dss.c   |  51 ++++++++++++++++----
+ ssh-ecdsa.c |  40 ++++++++++++----
+ ssh-rsa.c   |  22 +++++++--
+ 8 files changed, 287 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c
+index 7b96921..35f8de1 100644
+--- a/authfd.c
++++ b/authfd.c
+@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@ ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int versio
+ 	case 1:
+ 		key = pamsshagentauth_key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+ 		bits = pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->e);
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n);
+ 		*comment = pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
+@@ -379,6 +380,15 @@ ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int versio
+ 		if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
+ 			    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
++#else
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, RSA_get0_e(key->rsa));
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, RSA_get0_n(key->rsa));
++		*comment = pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
++		keybits = BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_n(key->rsa));
++		if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits)
++			pamsshagentauth_logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
++			    BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_n(key->rsa)), bits);
++#endif
+ 		break;
+ 	case 2:
+ 		blob = pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, &blen);
+@@ -422,9 +432,15 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
+ 	}
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&buffer);
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->e);
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->n);
++#else
++	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_n(key->rsa)));
++	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, RSA_get0_e(key->rsa));
++	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, RSA_get0_n(key->rsa));
++#endif
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, challenge);
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_append(&buffer, session_id, 16);
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(&buffer, response_type);
+@@ -501,6 +517,7 @@ ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
+ static void
+ ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
+ {
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(b, BN_num_bits(key->n));
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, key->n);
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, key->e);
+@@ -509,6 +526,16 @@ ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, key->iqmp);	/* ssh key->u */
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, key->q);	/* ssh key->p, SSL key->q */
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, key->p);	/* ssh key->q, SSL key->p */
++#else
++	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(b, BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_n(key)));
++	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, RSA_get0_n(key));
++	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, RSA_get0_e(key));
++	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, RSA_get0_d(key));
++	/* To keep within the protocol: p < q for ssh. in SSL p > q */
++	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, RSA_get0_iqmp(key));	/* ssh key->u */
++	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, RSA_get0_q(key));	/* ssh key->p, SSL key->q */
++	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, RSA_get0_p(key));	/* ssh key->q, SSL key->p */
++#endif
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -518,19 +545,36 @@ ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(b, key_ssh_name(key));
+ 	switch (key->type) {
+ 	case KEY_RSA:
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n);
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e);
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d);
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp);
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p);
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q);
++#else
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, RSA_get0_n(key->rsa));
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, RSA_get0_e(key->rsa));
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, RSA_get0_d(key->rsa));
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, RSA_get0_iqmp(key->rsa));
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, RSA_get0_p(key->rsa));
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, RSA_get0_q(key->rsa));
++#endif
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p);
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q);
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g);
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key);
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key);
++#else
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, DSA_get0_p(key->dsa));
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, DSA_get0_q(key->dsa));
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, DSA_get0_g(key->dsa));
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, DSA_get0_pub_key(key->dsa));
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, DSA_get0_priv_key(key->dsa));
++#endif
+ 		break;
+ 	}
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
+@@ -610,9 +654,15 @@ ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key)
+ 
+ 	if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->e);
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->n);
++#else
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_n(key->rsa)));
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&msg, RSA_get0_e(key->rsa));
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&msg, RSA_get0_n(key->rsa));
++#endif
+ 	} else if (key->type == KEY_DSA || key->type == KEY_RSA) {
+ 		pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen);
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY);
+diff --git a/bufbn.c b/bufbn.c
+index 6a49c73..4ecedc1 100644
+--- a/bufbn.c
++++ b/bufbn.c
+@@ -151,7 +151,11 @@ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(buffer, 0);
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 	if (value->neg) {
++#else
++	if (BN_is_negative(value)) {
++#endif
+ 		pamsshagentauth_logerror("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: negative numbers not supported");
+ 		return (-1);
+ 	}
+diff --git a/cipher.h b/cipher.h
+index 49bbc16..64f59ca 100644
+--- a/cipher.h
++++ b/cipher.h
+@@ -59,15 +59,18 @@
+ #define CIPHER_DECRYPT		0
+ 
+ typedef struct Cipher Cipher;
+-typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext;
++// typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext;
+ 
+ struct Cipher;
++/*
+ struct CipherContext {
+ 	int	plaintext;
+ 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX evp;
+ 	Cipher *cipher;
+ };
++*/
+ 
++/*
+ u_int	 cipher_mask_ssh1(int);
+ Cipher	*cipher_by_name(const char *);
+ Cipher	*cipher_by_number(int);
+@@ -88,4 +91,5 @@ void	 cipher_set_keyiv(CipherContext *, u_char *);
+ int	 cipher_get_keyiv_len(const CipherContext *);
+ int	 cipher_get_keycontext(const CipherContext *, u_char *);
+ void	 cipher_set_keycontext(CipherContext *, u_char *);
++*/
+ #endif				/* CIPHER_H */
+diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
+index 8e29c90..81ca57d 100644
+--- a/kex.h
++++ b/kex.h
+@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ enum kex_exchange {
+ #define KEX_INIT_SENT	0x0001
+ 
+ typedef struct Kex Kex;
+-typedef struct Mac Mac;
++// typedef struct Mac Mac;
+ typedef struct Comp Comp;
+ typedef struct Enc Enc;
+ typedef struct Newkeys Newkeys;
+@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct Enc {
+ 	u_char	*key;
+ 	u_char	*iv;
+ };
++/*
+ struct Mac {
+ 	char	*name;
+ 	int	enabled;
+@@ -95,11 +96,13 @@ struct Mac {
+ 	HMAC_CTX	evp_ctx;
+ 	struct umac_ctx *umac_ctx;
+ };
++*/
+ struct Comp {
+ 	int	type;
+ 	int	enabled;
+ 	char	*name;
+ };
++/*
+ struct Newkeys {
+ 	Enc	enc;
+ 	Mac	mac;
+@@ -126,7 +129,9 @@ struct Kex {
+ 	int	(*host_key_index)(Key *);
+ 	void	(*kex[KEX_MAX])(Kex *);
+ };
++*/
+ 
++/*
+ Kex	*kex_setup(char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
+ void	 kex_finish(Kex *);
+ 
+@@ -152,6 +157,8 @@ kexgex_hash(const EVP_MD *, char *, char *, char *, int, char *,
+ void
+ derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_int8_t[8], u_int8_t[16]);
+ 
++*/
++
+ #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH)
+ void	dump_digest(char *, u_char *, int);
+ #endif
+diff --git a/key.c b/key.c
+index 107a442..aedbbb5 100644
+--- a/key.c
++++ b/key.c
+@@ -77,15 +77,21 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_new(int type)
+ 	case KEY_RSA:
+ 		if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: RSA_new failed");
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 		if ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
+ 		if ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
++#else
++		if (RSA_set0_key(rsa, BN_new(), BN_new(), NULL) != 1)
++			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: RSA_set0_key failed");
++#endif
+ 		k->rsa = rsa;
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 		if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: DSA_new failed");
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 		if ((dsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
+ 		if ((dsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL)
+@@ -94,6 +100,12 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_new(int type)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
+ 		if ((dsa->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
++#else
++		if (DSA_set0_pqg(dsa, BN_new(), BN_new(), BN_new()) != 1)
++			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: DSA_set0_pqg failed");
++		if (DSA_set0_key(dsa, BN_new(), NULL) != 1)
++			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: DSA_set0_key failed");
++#endif
+ 		k->dsa = dsa;
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEY_ECDSA:
+@@ -118,6 +130,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_new_private(int type)
+ 	switch (k->type) {
+ 	case KEY_RSA1:
+ 	case KEY_RSA:
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 		if ((k->rsa->d = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
+ 		if ((k->rsa->iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL)
+@@ -130,14 +143,30 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_new_private(int type)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
+ 		if ((k->rsa->dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
++#else
++		if (RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, BN_new()) != 1)
++			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: RSA_set0_key failed");
++		if (RSA_set0_crt_params(k->rsa, BN_new(), BN_new(), BN_new()) != 1)
++			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: RSA_set0_crt_params failed");
++		if (RSA_set0_factors(k->rsa, BN_new(), BN_new()) != 1)
++			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: RSA_set0_factors failed");
++#endif
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 		if ((k->dsa->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
++#else
++		if (DSA_set0_key(k->dsa, NULL, BN_new()) != 1)
++			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new_private: DSA_set0_key failed");
++#endif
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEY_ECDSA:
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 		if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, BN_new()) != 1)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new_private: EC_KEY_set_private_key failed");
++#else
++#endif
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEY_ED25519:
+ 		RAND_bytes(k->ed25519->sk, sizeof(k->ed25519->sk));
+@@ -195,14 +224,26 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_equal(const Key *a, const Key *b)
+ 	case KEY_RSA1:
+ 	case KEY_RSA:
+ 		return a->rsa != NULL && b->rsa != NULL &&
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 		    BN_cmp(a->rsa->e, b->rsa->e) == 0 &&
+ 		    BN_cmp(a->rsa->n, b->rsa->n) == 0;
++#else
++		    BN_cmp(RSA_get0_e(a->rsa), RSA_get0_e(b->rsa)) == 0 &&
++		    BN_cmp(RSA_get0_n(a->rsa), RSA_get0_n(b->rsa)) == 0;
++#endif
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 		return a->dsa != NULL && b->dsa != NULL &&
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 		    BN_cmp(a->dsa->p, b->dsa->p) == 0 &&
+ 		    BN_cmp(a->dsa->q, b->dsa->q) == 0 &&
+ 		    BN_cmp(a->dsa->g, b->dsa->g) == 0 &&
+ 		    BN_cmp(a->dsa->pub_key, b->dsa->pub_key) == 0;
++#else
++		    BN_cmp(DSA_get0_p(a->dsa), DSA_get0_p(b->dsa)) == 0 &&
++		    BN_cmp(DSA_get0_q(a->dsa), DSA_get0_q(b->dsa)) == 0 &&
++		    BN_cmp(DSA_get0_g(a->dsa), DSA_get0_g(b->dsa)) == 0 &&
++		    BN_cmp(DSA_get0_pub_key(a->dsa), DSA_get0_pub_key(b->dsa)) == 0;
++#endif
+ 	case KEY_ECDSA:
+ 		return a->ecdsa != NULL && b->ecdsa != NULL &&
+ 			EC_KEY_check_key(a->ecdsa) == 1 &&
+@@ -231,7 +272,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type,
+     u_int *dgst_raw_length)
+ {
+ 	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+-	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
++	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
+ 	u_char *blob = NULL;
+ 	u_char *retval = NULL;
+ 	u_int len = 0;
+@@ -252,12 +293,21 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type,
+ 	}
+ 	switch (k->type) {
+ 	case KEY_RSA1:
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 		nlen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->n);
+ 		elen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->e);
+ 		len = nlen + elen;
+ 		blob = pamsshagentauth_xmalloc(len);
+ 		BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->n, blob);
+ 		BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->e, blob + nlen);
++#else
++		nlen = BN_num_bytes(RSA_get0_n(k->rsa));
++		elen = BN_num_bytes(RSA_get0_e(k->rsa));
++		len = nlen + elen;
++		blob = pamsshagentauth_xmalloc(len);
++		BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_n(k->rsa), blob);
++		BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_e(k->rsa), blob + nlen);
++#endif
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 	case KEY_ECDSA:
+@@ -273,11 +323,14 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type,
+ 	}
+ 	if (blob != NULL) {
+ 		retval = pamsshagentauth_xmalloc(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+-		EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, md);
+-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, blob, len);
+-		EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, retval, dgst_raw_length);
++		/* XXX Errors from EVP_* functions are not hadled */
++		ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
++		EVP_DigestInit(ctx, md);
++		EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, blob, len);
++		EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, retval, dgst_raw_length);
+ 		memset(blob, 0, len);
+ 		pamsshagentauth_xfree(blob);
++		EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
+ 	} else {
+ 		pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_fingerprint_raw: blob is null");
+ 	}
+@@ -457,10 +510,17 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
+ 			return -1;
+ 		*cpp = cp;
+ 		/* Get public exponent, public modulus. */
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 		if (!read_bignum(cpp, ret->rsa->e))
+ 			return -1;
+ 		if (!read_bignum(cpp, ret->rsa->n))
+ 			return -1;
++#else
++		if (!read_bignum(cpp, RSA_get0_e(ret->rsa)))
++			return -1;
++		if (!read_bignum(cpp, RSA_get0_n(ret->rsa)))
++			return -1;
++#endif
+ 		success = 1;
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEY_UNSPEC:
+@@ -583,10 +643,17 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_write(const Key *key, FILE *f)
+ 
+ 	if (key->type == KEY_RSA1 && key->rsa != NULL) {
+ 		/* size of modulus 'n' */
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 		bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
+ 		fprintf(f, "%u", bits);
+ 		if (write_bignum(f, key->rsa->e) &&
+ 		    write_bignum(f, key->rsa->n)) {
++#else
++		bits = BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_n(key->rsa));
++		fprintf(f, "%u", bits);
++		if (write_bignum(f, RSA_get0_e(key->rsa)) &&
++		    write_bignum(f, RSA_get0_n(key->rsa))) {
++#endif
+ 			success = 1;
+ 		} else {
+ 			pamsshagentauth_logerror("key_write: failed for RSA key");
+@@ -675,10 +742,17 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_size(const Key *k)
+ {
+ 	switch (k->type) {
+ 	case KEY_RSA1:
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 	case KEY_RSA:
+ 		return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n);
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 		return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p);
++#else
++	case KEY_RSA:
++		return BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_n(k->rsa));
++	case KEY_DSA:
++		return BN_num_bits(DSA_get0_p(k->dsa));
++#endif
+ 	case KEY_ECDSA:
+ 	{
+ 		int nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa));
+@@ -769,17 +843,29 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_from_private(const Key *k)
+ 	switch (k->type) {
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 		n = pamsshagentauth_key_new(k->type);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 		if ((BN_copy(n->dsa->p, k->dsa->p) == NULL) ||
+ 		    (BN_copy(n->dsa->q, k->dsa->q) == NULL) ||
+ 		    (BN_copy(n->dsa->g, k->dsa->g) == NULL) ||
+ 		    (BN_copy(n->dsa->pub_key, k->dsa->pub_key) == NULL))
++#else
++		if ((BN_copy(DSA_get0_p(n->dsa), DSA_get0_p(k->dsa)) == NULL) ||
++		    (BN_copy(DSA_get0_q(n->dsa), DSA_get0_q(k->dsa)) == NULL) ||
++		    (BN_copy(DSA_get0_g(n->dsa), DSA_get0_g(k->dsa)) == NULL) ||
++		    (BN_copy(DSA_get0_pub_key(n->dsa), DSA_get0_pub_key(k->dsa)) == NULL))
++#endif
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_from_private: BN_copy failed");
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEY_RSA:
+ 	case KEY_RSA1:
+ 		n = pamsshagentauth_key_new(k->type);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 		if ((BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n) == NULL) ||
+ 		    (BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e) == NULL))
++#else
++		if ((BN_copy(RSA_get0_n(n->rsa), RSA_get0_n(k->rsa)) == NULL) ||
++		    (BN_copy(RSA_get0_e(n->rsa), RSA_get0_e(k->rsa)) == NULL))
++#endif
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_from_private: BN_copy failed");
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEY_ECDSA:
+@@ -881,8 +967,13 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
+ 	switch (type) {
+ 	case KEY_RSA:
+ 		key = pamsshagentauth_key_new(type);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 		if (pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->rsa->e) == -1 ||
+ 		    pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->rsa->n) == -1) {
++#else
++		if (pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, RSA_get0_e(key->rsa)) == -1 ||
++		    pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, RSA_get0_n(key->rsa)) == -1) {
++#endif
+ 			pamsshagentauth_logerror("key_from_blob: can't read rsa key");
+ 			pamsshagentauth_key_free(key);
+ 			key = NULL;
+@@ -894,10 +985,17 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 		key = pamsshagentauth_key_new(type);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 		if (pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->p) == -1 ||
+ 		    pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->q) == -1 ||
+ 		    pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->g) == -1 ||
+ 		    pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->pub_key) == -1) {
++#else
++		if (pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, DSA_get0_p(key->dsa)) == -1 ||
++		    pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, DSA_get0_q(key->dsa)) == -1 ||
++		    pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, DSA_get0_g(key->dsa)) == -1 ||
++		    pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, DSA_get0_pub_key(key->dsa)) == -1) {
++#endif
+ 			pamsshagentauth_logerror("key_from_blob: can't read dsa key");
+ 			pamsshagentauth_key_free(key);
+ 			key = NULL;
+@@ -1015,6 +1113,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
+ 	}
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b);
+ 	switch (key->type) {
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(key));
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->p);
+@@ -1027,6 +1126,20 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->e);
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->n);
+ 		break;
++#else
++	case KEY_DSA:
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(key));
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(&b, DSA_get0_p(key->dsa));
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(&b, DSA_get0_q(key->dsa));
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(&b, DSA_get0_g(key->dsa));
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(&b, DSA_get0_pub_key(key->dsa));
++		break;
++	case KEY_RSA:
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(key));
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(&b, RSA_get0_e(key->rsa));
++		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(&b, RSA_get0_n(key->rsa));
++		break;
++#endif
+ 	case KEY_ECDSA:
+ 	{
+ 		size_t l = 0;
+@@ -1138,14 +1251,20 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_demote(const Key *k)
+ 	case KEY_RSA:
+ 		if ((pk->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: RSA_new failed");
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 		if ((pk->rsa->e = BN_dup(k->rsa->e)) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+ 		if ((pk->rsa->n = BN_dup(k->rsa->n)) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
++#else
++		if (RSA_set0_key(pk->rsa, BN_dup(RSA_get0_n(k->rsa)), BN_dup(RSA_get0_e(k->rsa)), NULL) != 1)
++			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: RSA_set0_key failed");
++#endif
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 		if ((pk->dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: DSA_new failed");
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 		if ((pk->dsa->p = BN_dup(k->dsa->p)) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+ 		if ((pk->dsa->q = BN_dup(k->dsa->q)) == NULL)
+@@ -1154,6 +1273,12 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_demote(const Key *k)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+ 		if ((pk->dsa->pub_key = BN_dup(k->dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
++#else
++		if (DSA_set0_pqg(pk->dsa, BN_dup(DSA_get0_p(k->dsa)), BN_dup(DSA_get0_q(k->dsa)), BN_dup(DSA_get0_g(k->dsa))) != 1)
++			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: DSA_set0_pqg failed");
++		if (DSA_set0_key(pk->dsa, BN_dup(DSA_get0_pub_key(k->dsa)), NULL) != 1)
++			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: DSA_set0_key failed");
++#endif
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEY_ECDSA:
+ 		pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: implement me");
+diff --git a/ssh-dss.c b/ssh-dss.c
+index 9fdaa5d..1051ae2 100644
+--- a/ssh-dss.c
++++ b/ssh-dss.c
+@@ -48,37 +48,53 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+ {
+ 	DSA_SIG *sig;
+ 	const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+-	EVP_MD_CTX md;
++	EVP_MD_CTX *md;
+ 	u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
+ 	u_int rlen, slen, len, dlen;
+ 	Buffer b;
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++	const BIGNUM *r, *s;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_DSA || key->dsa == NULL) {
+ 		pamsshagentauth_logerror("ssh_dss_sign: no DSA key");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+-	EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
+-	EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
++	md = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
++	EVP_DigestInit(md, evp_md);
++	EVP_DigestUpdate(md, data, datalen);
++	EVP_DigestFinal(md, digest, &dlen);
+ 
+ 	sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa);
+ 	memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
++	EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md);
+ 
+ 	if (sig == NULL) {
+ 		pamsshagentauth_logerror("ssh_dss_sign: sign failed");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 	rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig->r);
+ 	slen = BN_num_bytes(sig->s);
++#else
++	DSA_SIG_get0((const DSA_SIG *)sig, (const BIGNUM **)r, (const BIGNUM **)s);
++	rlen = BN_num_bytes(r);
++	slen = BN_num_bytes(s);
++#endif
+ 	if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) {
+ 		pamsshagentauth_logerror("bad sig size %u %u", rlen, slen);
+ 		DSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 	memset(sigblob, 0, SIGBLOB_LEN);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 	BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen);
+ 	BN_bn2bin(sig->s, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - slen);
++#else
++	BN_bn2bin(r, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen);
++	BN_bn2bin(s, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - slen);
++#endif
+ 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ 
+ 	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) {
+@@ -110,11 +126,14 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
+ {
+ 	DSA_SIG *sig;
+ 	const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+-	EVP_MD_CTX md;
++	EVP_MD_CTX *md;
+ 	u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *sigblob;
+ 	u_int len, dlen;
+ 	int rlen, ret;
+ 	Buffer b;
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++	BIGNUM *r, *s;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_DSA || key->dsa == NULL) {
+ 		pamsshagentauth_logerror("ssh_dss_verify: no DSA key");
+@@ -157,6 +176,7 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
+ 	/* parse signature */
+ 	if ((sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
+ 		pamsshagentauth_fatal("ssh_dss_verify: DSA_SIG_new failed");
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 	if ((sig->r = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ 		pamsshagentauth_fatal("ssh_dss_verify: BN_new failed");
+ 	if ((sig->s = BN_new()) == NULL)
+@@ -164,18 +184,33 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
+ 	if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->r) == NULL) ||
+ 	    (BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->s) == NULL))
+ 		pamsshagentauth_fatal("ssh_dss_verify: BN_bin2bn failed");
++#else
++	if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
++		pamsshagentauth_fatal("ssh_dss_verify: BN_new failed");
++	if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
++		pamsshagentauth_fatal("ssh_dss_verify: BN_new failed");
++	if (DSA_SIG_set0(sig, r, s) != 1)
++		pamsshagentauth_fatal("ssh_dss_verify: DSA_SIG_set0 failed");
++	if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, r) == NULL) ||
++	    (BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, s) == NULL))
++		pamsshagentauth_fatal("ssh_dss_verify: BN_bin2bn failed");
++	if (DSA_SIG_set0(sig, r, s) != 1)
++		pamsshagentauth_fatal("ssh_dss_verify: DSA_SIG_set0 failed");
++#endif
+ 
+ 	/* clean up */
+ 	memset(sigblob, 0, len);
+ 	pamsshagentauth_xfree(sigblob);
+ 
+ 	/* sha1 the data */
+-	EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
+-	EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
++	md = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
++	EVP_DigestInit(md, evp_md);
++	EVP_DigestUpdate(md, data, datalen);
++	EVP_DigestFinal(md, digest, &dlen);
+ 
+ 	ret = DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa);
+ 	memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
++	EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md);
+ 
+ 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ 
+diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa.c b/ssh-ecdsa.c
+index efa0f3d..c213959 100644
+--- a/ssh-ecdsa.c
++++ b/ssh-ecdsa.c
+@@ -41,22 +41,27 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+ {
+     ECDSA_SIG *sig;
+     const EVP_MD *evp_md = evp_from_key(key);
+-    EVP_MD_CTX md;
++    EVP_MD_CTX *md;
+     u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+     u_int len, dlen;
+     Buffer b, bb;
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++	BIGNUM *r, *s;
++#endif
+ 
+     if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_ECDSA || key->ecdsa == NULL) {
+         pamsshagentauth_logerror("ssh_ecdsa_sign: no ECDSA key");
+         return -1;
+     }
+ 
+-    EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+-    EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
+-    EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
++    md = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
++    EVP_DigestInit(md, evp_md);
++    EVP_DigestUpdate(md, data, datalen);
++    EVP_DigestFinal(md, digest, &dlen);
+ 
+     sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa);
+     memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
++    EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md);
+ 
+     if (sig == NULL) {
+         pamsshagentauth_logerror("ssh_ecdsa_sign: sign failed");
+@@ -64,8 +69,14 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+     }
+ 
+     pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&bb);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+     if (pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&bb, sig->r) == -1 ||
+         pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&bb, sig->s) == -1) {
++#else
++    DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &r, &s);
++    if (pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&bb, r) == -1 ||
++        pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&bb, s) == -1) {
++#endif
+         pamsshagentauth_logerror("couldn't serialize signature");
+         ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+         return -1;
+@@ -94,11 +105,14 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
+ {
+     ECDSA_SIG *sig;
+     const EVP_MD *evp_md = evp_from_key(key);
+-    EVP_MD_CTX md;
++    EVP_MD_CTX *md;
+     u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *sigblob;
+     u_int len, dlen;
+     int rlen, ret;
+     Buffer b;
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++	BIGNUM *r, *s;
++#endif
+ 
+     if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_ECDSA || key->ecdsa == NULL) {
+         pamsshagentauth_logerror("ssh_ecdsa_sign: no ECDSA key");
+@@ -127,8 +141,14 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
+ 
+     pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b);
+     pamsshagentauth_buffer_append(&b, sigblob, len);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+     if ((pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, sig->r) == -1) ||
+         (pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, sig->s) == -1))
++#else
++    DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &r, &s);
++    if ((pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, r) == -1) ||
++        (pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, s) == -1))
++#endif
+         pamsshagentauth_fatal("ssh_ecdsa_verify:"
+             "pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret failed");
+ 
+@@ -137,16 +157,18 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
+     pamsshagentauth_xfree(sigblob);
+ 
+     /* sha256 the data */
+-    EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+-    EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
+-    EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
++    md = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
++    EVP_DigestInit(md, evp_md);
++    EVP_DigestUpdate(md, data, datalen);
++    EVP_DigestFinal(md, digest, &dlen);
+ 
+     ret = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa);
+     memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
++    EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md);
+ 
+     ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ 
+     pamsshagentauth_verbose("ssh_ecdsa_verify: signature %s",
+         ret == 1 ? "correct" : ret == 0 ? "incorrect" : "error");
+     return ret;
+-}
+\ No newline at end of file
++}
+diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
+index d05844b..9d74eb6 100644
+--- a/ssh-rsa.c
++++ b/ssh-rsa.c
+@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+     const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+ {
+ 	const EVP_MD *evp_md;
+-	EVP_MD_CTX md;
++	EVP_MD_CTX *md;
+ 	u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *sig;
+ 	u_int slen, dlen, len;
+ 	int ok, nid;
+@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+ 		pamsshagentauth_logerror("ssh_rsa_sign: EVP_get_digestbynid %d failed", nid);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	md = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ 	EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+ 	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
+ 	EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
+@@ -64,6 +65,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+ 
+ 	ok = RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa);
+ 	memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
++	EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md);
+ 
+ 	if (ok != 1) {
+ 		int ecode = ERR_get_error();
+@@ -107,7 +109,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
+ {
+ 	Buffer b;
+ 	const EVP_MD *evp_md;
+-	EVP_MD_CTX md;
++	EVP_MD_CTX *md;
+ 	char *ktype;
+ 	u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *sigblob;
+ 	u_int len, dlen, modlen;
+@@ -117,9 +119,17 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
+ 		pamsshagentauth_logerror("ssh_rsa_verify: no RSA key");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 	if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
++#else
++	if (BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_n(key->rsa)) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
++#endif
+ 		pamsshagentauth_logerror("ssh_rsa_verify: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 		    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
++#else
++		    BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_n(key->rsa)), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
++#endif
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b);
+@@ -161,12 +171,14 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
+ 		pamsshagentauth_xfree(sigblob);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+-	EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
+-	EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
++	md = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
++	EVP_DigestInit(md, evp_md);
++	EVP_DigestUpdate(md, data, datalen);
++	EVP_DigestFinal(md, digest, &dlen);
+ 
+ 	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(nid, digest, dlen, sigblob, len, key->rsa);
+ 	memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
++	EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md);
+ 	memset(sigblob, 's', len);
+ 	pamsshagentauth_xfree(sigblob);
+ 	pamsshagentauth_verbose("ssh_rsa_verify: signature %scorrect", (ret==0) ? "in" : "");
+
+From 4dc87369134f215378042ec4d971a4fe48d1a02b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Guido Falsi <mad@madpilot.net>
+Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2018 20:36:15 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Check against the correct OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
+
+Alexey Dokuchaev (a fellow FreeBSD developer) pointed out to me the opaque structures were introduced in 1.1.0-pre
+5, so the correct OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to discriminate is 0x10100005L.
+---
+ authfd.c    | 12 ++++++------
+ bufbn.c     |  2 +-
+ key.c       | 36 ++++++++++++++++++------------------
+ ssh-dss.c   | 10 +++++-----
+ ssh-ecdsa.c |  8 ++++----
+ ssh-rsa.c   |  4 ++--
+ 6 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c
+index 35f8de1..01d1d89 100644
+--- a/authfd.c
++++ b/authfd.c
+@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int versio
+ 	case 1:
+ 		key = pamsshagentauth_key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+ 		bits = pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->e);
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n);
+ 		*comment = pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
+@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
+ 	}
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&buffer);
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE);
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->e);
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->n);
+@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
+ static void
+ ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
+ {
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(b, BN_num_bits(key->n));
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, key->n);
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, key->e);
+@@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(b, key_ssh_name(key));
+ 	switch (key->type) {
+ 	case KEY_RSA:
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n);
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e);
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d);
+@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
+ #endif
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p);
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q);
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g);
+@@ -654,7 +654,7 @@ ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key)
+ 
+ 	if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY);
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->e);
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->n);
+diff --git a/bufbn.c b/bufbn.c
+index 4ecedc1..b4754cc 100644
+--- a/bufbn.c
++++ b/bufbn.c
+@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(buffer, 0);
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 	if (value->neg) {
+ #else
+ 	if (BN_is_negative(value)) {
+diff --git a/key.c b/key.c
+index aedbbb5..dcc5fc8 100644
+--- a/key.c
++++ b/key.c
+@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_new(int type)
+ 	case KEY_RSA:
+ 		if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: RSA_new failed");
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 		if ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
+ 		if ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL)
+@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_new(int type)
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 		if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: DSA_new failed");
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 		if ((dsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
+ 		if ((dsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL)
+@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_new_private(int type)
+ 	switch (k->type) {
+ 	case KEY_RSA1:
+ 	case KEY_RSA:
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 		if ((k->rsa->d = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
+ 		if ((k->rsa->iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL)
+@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_new_private(int type)
+ #endif
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 		if ((k->dsa->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
+ #else
+@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_new_private(int type)
+ #endif
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEY_ECDSA:
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 		if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, BN_new()) != 1)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new_private: EC_KEY_set_private_key failed");
+ #else
+@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_equal(const Key *a, const Key *b)
+ 	case KEY_RSA1:
+ 	case KEY_RSA:
+ 		return a->rsa != NULL && b->rsa != NULL &&
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 		    BN_cmp(a->rsa->e, b->rsa->e) == 0 &&
+ 		    BN_cmp(a->rsa->n, b->rsa->n) == 0;
+ #else
+@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_equal(const Key *a, const Key *b)
+ #endif
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 		return a->dsa != NULL && b->dsa != NULL &&
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 		    BN_cmp(a->dsa->p, b->dsa->p) == 0 &&
+ 		    BN_cmp(a->dsa->q, b->dsa->q) == 0 &&
+ 		    BN_cmp(a->dsa->g, b->dsa->g) == 0 &&
+@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type,
+ 	}
+ 	switch (k->type) {
+ 	case KEY_RSA1:
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 		nlen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->n);
+ 		elen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->e);
+ 		len = nlen + elen;
+@@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
+ 			return -1;
+ 		*cpp = cp;
+ 		/* Get public exponent, public modulus. */
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 		if (!read_bignum(cpp, ret->rsa->e))
+ 			return -1;
+ 		if (!read_bignum(cpp, ret->rsa->n))
+@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_write(const Key *key, FILE *f)
+ 
+ 	if (key->type == KEY_RSA1 && key->rsa != NULL) {
+ 		/* size of modulus 'n' */
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 		bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
+ 		fprintf(f, "%u", bits);
+ 		if (write_bignum(f, key->rsa->e) &&
+@@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_size(const Key *k)
+ {
+ 	switch (k->type) {
+ 	case KEY_RSA1:
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 	case KEY_RSA:
+ 		return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n);
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+@@ -843,7 +843,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_from_private(const Key *k)
+ 	switch (k->type) {
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 		n = pamsshagentauth_key_new(k->type);
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 		if ((BN_copy(n->dsa->p, k->dsa->p) == NULL) ||
+ 		    (BN_copy(n->dsa->q, k->dsa->q) == NULL) ||
+ 		    (BN_copy(n->dsa->g, k->dsa->g) == NULL) ||
+@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_from_private(const Key *k)
+ 	case KEY_RSA:
+ 	case KEY_RSA1:
+ 		n = pamsshagentauth_key_new(k->type);
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 		if ((BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n) == NULL) ||
+ 		    (BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e) == NULL))
+ #else
+@@ -967,7 +967,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
+ 	switch (type) {
+ 	case KEY_RSA:
+ 		key = pamsshagentauth_key_new(type);
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 		if (pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->rsa->e) == -1 ||
+ 		    pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->rsa->n) == -1) {
+ #else
+@@ -985,7 +985,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 		key = pamsshagentauth_key_new(type);
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 		if (pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->p) == -1 ||
+ 		    pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->q) == -1 ||
+ 		    pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->g) == -1 ||
+@@ -1113,7 +1113,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
+ 	}
+ 	pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b);
+ 	switch (key->type) {
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(key));
+ 		pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->p);
+@@ -1251,7 +1251,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_demote(const Key *k)
+ 	case KEY_RSA:
+ 		if ((pk->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: RSA_new failed");
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 		if ((pk->rsa->e = BN_dup(k->rsa->e)) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+ 		if ((pk->rsa->n = BN_dup(k->rsa->n)) == NULL)
+@@ -1264,7 +1264,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_demote(const Key *k)
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 		if ((pk->dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: DSA_new failed");
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 		if ((pk->dsa->p = BN_dup(k->dsa->p)) == NULL)
+ 			pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+ 		if ((pk->dsa->q = BN_dup(k->dsa->q)) == NULL)
+diff --git a/ssh-dss.c b/ssh-dss.c
+index 1051ae2..9b96274 100644
+--- a/ssh-dss.c
++++ b/ssh-dss.c
+@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+ 	u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
+ 	u_int rlen, slen, len, dlen;
+ 	Buffer b;
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100005L
+ 	const BIGNUM *r, *s;
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 	rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig->r);
+ 	slen = BN_num_bytes(sig->s);
+ #else
+@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 	memset(sigblob, 0, SIGBLOB_LEN);
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 	BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen);
+ 	BN_bn2bin(sig->s, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - slen);
+ #else
+@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
+ 	u_int len, dlen;
+ 	int rlen, ret;
+ 	Buffer b;
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100005L
+ 	BIGNUM *r, *s;
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
+ 	/* parse signature */
+ 	if ((sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
+ 		pamsshagentauth_fatal("ssh_dss_verify: DSA_SIG_new failed");
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 	if ((sig->r = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ 		pamsshagentauth_fatal("ssh_dss_verify: BN_new failed");
+ 	if ((sig->s = BN_new()) == NULL)
+diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa.c b/ssh-ecdsa.c
+index c213959..5b13b30 100644
+--- a/ssh-ecdsa.c
++++ b/ssh-ecdsa.c
+@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+     u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+     u_int len, dlen;
+     Buffer b, bb;
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100005L
+ 	BIGNUM *r, *s;
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+     }
+ 
+     pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&bb);
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+     if (pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&bb, sig->r) == -1 ||
+         pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&bb, sig->s) == -1) {
+ #else
+@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
+     u_int len, dlen;
+     int rlen, ret;
+     Buffer b;
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100005L
+ 	BIGNUM *r, *s;
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
+ 
+     pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b);
+     pamsshagentauth_buffer_append(&b, sigblob, len);
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+     if ((pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, sig->r) == -1) ||
+         (pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, sig->s) == -1))
+ #else
+diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
+index 9d74eb6..35f2e36 100644
+--- a/ssh-rsa.c
++++ b/ssh-rsa.c
+@@ -119,13 +119,13 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
+ 		pamsshagentauth_logerror("ssh_rsa_verify: no RSA key");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 	if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
+ #else
+ 	if (BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_n(key->rsa)) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
+ #endif
+ 		pamsshagentauth_logerror("ssh_rsa_verify: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100005L
+ 		    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
+ #else
+ 		    BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_n(key->rsa)), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
diff --git a/sys-auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth/metadata.xml b/sys-auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth/metadata.xml
index b2c4b0002ee6..cbaa4da90d44 100644
--- a/sys-auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth/metadata.xml
+++ b/sys-auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth/metadata.xml
@@ -6,5 +6,6 @@
 	</maintainer>
 	<upstream>
 		<remote-id type="sourceforge">pamsshagentauth</remote-id>
+		<remote-id type="github">jbeverly/pam_ssh_agent_auth</remote-id>
 	</upstream>
 </pkgmetadata>
diff --git a/sys-auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3.ebuild b/sys-auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3.ebuild
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8afccd4a9863
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sys-auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3.ebuild
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# Copyright 1999-2018 Gentoo Authors
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
+
+EAPI=7
+
+inherit pam
+
+DESCRIPTION="Simple module to authenticate users against their ssh-agent keys"
+HOMEPAGE="http://pamsshagentauth.sourceforge.net"
+
+if [[ ${PV} == *9999 ]] ; then
+	EGIT_REPO_URI="https://github.com/jbeverly/${PN}.git"
+	inherit git-r3
+else
+	SRC_URI="mirror://sourceforge/pamsshagentauth/${PN}/v${PV}/${P}.tar.bz2"
+	KEYWORDS="~amd64 ~arm ~x86"
+fi
+
+LICENSE="MIT"
+SLOT="0"
+IUSE=""
+
+PATCHES=(
+	"${FILESDIR}/${P}-openssl-1.1.1.patch"
+)
+DEPEND="virtual/pam
+	dev-libs/openssl:0="
+
+RDEPEND="${DEPEND}
+	virtual/ssh"
+
+# needed for pod2man
+DEPEND="${DEPEND}
+	dev-lang/perl"
+
+src_configure() {
+	pammod_hide_symbols
+
+	econf \
+		--without-openssl-header-check \
+		--libexecdir="$(getpam_mod_dir)"
+}
+
+src_install() {
+	# Don't use emake install as it makes it harder to have proper
+	# install paths.
+	dopammod pam_ssh_agent_auth.so
+	doman pam_ssh_agent_auth.8
+
+	dodoc CONTRIBUTORS
+}
diff --git a/sys-auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth-9999.ebuild b/sys-auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth-9999.ebuild
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2b877364229c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sys-auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth-9999.ebuild
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+# Copyright 1999-2018 Gentoo Authors
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
+
+EAPI=7
+
+inherit pam
+
+DESCRIPTION="Simple module to authenticate users against their ssh-agent keys"
+HOMEPAGE="http://pamsshagentauth.sourceforge.net"
+
+if [[ ${PV} == *9999 ]] ; then
+	EGIT_REPO_URI="https://github.com/jbeverly/${PN}.git"
+	inherit git-r3
+else
+	SRC_URI="mirror://sourceforge/pamsshagentauth/${PN}/v${PV}/${P}.tar.bz2"
+	KEYWORDS="~amd64 ~arm ~x86"
+fi
+
+LICENSE="MIT"
+SLOT="0"
+IUSE=""
+
+DEPEND="virtual/pam
+	dev-libs/openssl:0="
+
+RDEPEND="${DEPEND}
+	virtual/ssh"
+
+# needed for pod2man
+DEPEND="${DEPEND}
+	dev-lang/perl"
+
+src_configure() {
+	pammod_hide_symbols
+
+	econf \
+		--without-openssl-header-check \
+		--libexecdir="$(getpam_mod_dir)"
+}
+
+src_install() {
+	# Don't use emake install as it makes it harder to have proper
+	# install paths.
+	dopammod pam_ssh_agent_auth.so
+	doman pam_ssh_agent_auth.8
+
+	dodoc CONTRIBUTORS
+}