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/*
* Copyright 2015-2024 Gentoo Foundation
* Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
*
* Copyright 2015-2024 Mike Frysinger - <vapier@gentoo.org>
*/
#include "paxinc.h"
#include "seccomp-bpf.h"
#ifdef __linux__
/* Older versions of Linux might not have these. */
#ifndef CLONE_NEWIPC
#define CLONE_NEWIPC 0
#endif
#ifndef CLONE_NEWNET
#define CLONE_NEWNET 0
#endif
#ifndef CLONE_NEWNS
#define CLONE_NEWNS 0
#endif
#ifndef CLONE_NEWPID
#define CLONE_NEWPID 0
#endif
#ifndef CLONE_NEWUTS
#define CLONE_NEWUTS 0
#endif
#ifndef PR_SET_SECCOMP
#define PR_SET_SECCOMP 22
#endif
#ifndef SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
#define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER 2
#endif
#ifdef __SANITIZE_ADDRESS__
/* ASAN does some weird stuff. */
# define ALLOW_PIDNS 0
# undef WANT_SECCOMP
#else
# define ALLOW_PIDNS 1
#endif
#ifndef SECCOMP_BPF_AVAILABLE
# undef WANT_SECCOMP
#endif
#if PAX_UTILS_LIBFUZZ
# undef WANT_SECCOMP
#endif
static int ns_unshare(int flags)
{
int flag, ret = 0;
/* Try to oneshot it. Maybe we'll get lucky! */
if (unshare(flags) == 0)
return flags;
/* No access at all, so don't waste time below. */
else if (errno == EPERM)
return ret;
/*
* We have to run these one permission at a time because if any are
* not supported (too old a kernel, or it's disabled), then all of
* them will be rejected and we won't know which one is a problem.
*/
/* First the ones that work against the current process. */
flag = 1;
while (flags) {
if (flags & flag) {
if (unshare(flag) == 0)
ret |= flag;
flags &= ~flag;
}
flag <<= 1;
}
return ret;
}
void security_init_pid(void)
{
int flags;
if (!ALLOW_PIDNS || CLONE_NEWPID == 0)
return;
flags = ns_unshare(CLONE_NEWPID);
if (USE_SLOW_SECURITY) {
if (flags & CLONE_NEWPID)
if (vfork() == 0)
_exit(0);
}
}
void security_init(bool allow_forking)
{
(void) allow_forking;
int flags;
if (!ALLOW_PIDNS)
allow_forking = true;
/* Drop all possible caps for us and our children. */
#ifdef PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS /* New to linux-3.5 */
prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
#endif
#ifdef PR_SET_SECUREBITS /* New to linux-2.6.26 */
# ifdef SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED /* New to linux-2.6.33 (all SECBIT_xxx) */
prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS,
SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED |
SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP |
SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED |
SECBIT_NOROOT |
SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED, 0, 0, 0);
# endif
#endif
/* None of the pax tools need access to these features. */
flags = CLONE_NEWIPC | CLONE_NEWUTS;
/* Would be nice to leverage mount/net ns, but they're just way too slow. */
if (USE_SLOW_SECURITY)
flags |= CLONE_NEWNET | CLONE_NEWNS;
if (!allow_forking)
flags |= CLONE_NEWPID;
flags = ns_unshare(flags);
if (USE_SLOW_SECURITY) {
/* We spawn one child and kill it so the kernel will fail in the future. */
if (flags & CLONE_NEWPID)
if (vfork() == 0)
_exit(0);
}
#ifdef WANT_SECCOMP
{
int ret;
if (allow_forking)
ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &seccomp_bpf_program_fork);
else
ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &seccomp_bpf_program_base);
if (ret)
warn("enabling seccomp failed");
}
#endif
}
#endif
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