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| author |   Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be> | 2012-07-30 21:22:49 +0200 |
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| committer | Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be> | 2012-07-30 21:22:49 +0200 |
| commit | 380cd1dcbd2b712ca5a850f77cb7aedbe83818d9 (patch) | |
| tree | 8f45995b1f703d2962f4c0574b5944c70f7f169f | |
| parent | Update previews. (diff) | |
| download | hardened-docs-380cd1dcbd2b712ca5a850f77cb7aedbe83818d9.tar.gz hardened-docs-380cd1dcbd2b712ca5a850f77cb7aedbe83818d9.tar.bz2 hardened-docs-380cd1dcbd2b712ca5a850f77cb7aedbe83818d9.zip | |
Adding concepts guide for integrity subproject
| -rw-r--r-- | xml/integrity/concepts.xml | 524 |
1 files changed, 524 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/xml/integrity/concepts.xml b/xml/integrity/concepts.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c8859f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/xml/integrity/concepts.xml @@ -0,0 +1,524 @@ +<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?> +<!DOCTYPE guide SYSTEM "/dtd/guide.dtd"> +<!-- $Header$ --> + +<guide lang="en"> +<title>Integrity - Introduction and Concepts</title> + +<author title="Author"> + <mail link="swift"/> +</author> + +<abstract> +Integrity validation is a wide field in which many technologies play a role. +This guide aims to offer a high-level view on what integrity validation is all +about and how the various technologies work together to achieve a (hopefully) +more secure environment to work in. +</abstract> + +<!-- The content of this document is licensed under the CC-BY-SA license --> +<!-- See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0 --> +<license version="3.0" /> + +<version>1</version> +<date>2012-07-30</date> + +<chapter> +<title>It is about trust</title> +<section> +<title>Introduction</title> +<body> + +<p> +Integrity is about trusting components within your environment, and in our case +the workstations, servers and machines you work on. You definitely want to be +certain that the workstation you type your credentials on to log on to the +infrastructure is not compromised in any way. This "trust" in your environment +is a combination of various factors: physical security, system security patching +process, secure configuration, access controls and more. +</p> + +<p> +Integrity plays a role in this security field: it tries to ensure that the +systems have not been tampered with by malicious people or organizations. And +this tamperproof-ness extends to a wide range of components that need to be +validated. You probably want to be certain that the binaries that are ran (and +libraries that are loaded) are those you built yourself (in case of Gentoo) or +were provided to you by someone (or something) you trust. And that the Linux +kernel you booted (and the modules that are loaded) are those you made, and not +someone else. +</p> + +<p> +Most people trust themselves and look at integrity as if it needs to prove that +things are still as you've built them. But to support this claim, the systems you +use to ensure integrity need to be trusted too: you want to make sure that +whatever system is in place to offer you the final yes/no on the integrity only +uses trusted information (did it really validate the binary) and services (is it +not running on a compromised system). To support these claims, many ideas, +technologies, processes and algorithms have passed the review. +</p> + +<p> +In this document, we will talk about a few of those, and how they play in the +Gentoo Hardened Integrity subprojects' vision and roadmap. +</p> + +</body> +</section> +</chapter> + +<chapter> +<title>Hash results</title> +<section> +<title>Algorithmically validating a file's content</title> +<body> + +<p> +Hashes are a primary method for validating if a file (or other resource) has +not been changed since it was first inspected. A hash is the result of a +mathematical calculation on the content of a file (most often a number or +ordered set of numbers), and exhibits the following properties: +</p> + +<ul> + <li> + The resulting number is represented in a <e>small (often fixed-size) length</e>. + This is necessary to allow fast verification if two hash values are the same + or not, but also to allow storing the value in a secure location (which is, + more than often, much more restricted in space). + </li> + <li> + The hash function always <e>returns the same hash</e> (output) when the file it + inspects has not been changed (input). Otherwise it'll be impossible to + ensure that the file content hasn't changed. + </li> + <li> + The hash function is fast to run (the calculation of a hash result does not + take up too much time or even resources). Without this property, it would + take too long to generate and even validate hash results, leading to users + being malcontent (and more likely to disable the validation alltogether). + </li> + <li> + The hash result <e>cannot be used to reconstruct</e> the file. Although this is + often seen as a result of the first property (small length), it is important + because hash results are often also seen as a "public validation" of data + that is otherwise private in nature. In other words, many processes relie on + the inability of users (or hackers) to reverse-engineer information based on + its hash result. A good example are passwords and password databases, which + <e>should</e> store hashes of the passwords, not the passwords themselves. + </li> + <li> + Given a hash result, it is near impossible to find another file with the + same hash result (or to create such a file yourself). Since the hash result + is limited in space, there are many inputs that will map onto the same + hash result. The power of a good hash function is that it is not feasible to + find them (or calculate them) except by brute force. When such a match is + found, it is called a <e>collision</e>. + </li> +</ul> + +<p> +Compared with checksums, hashes try to be more cryptographically secure (and as +such more effort is made in the last property to make sure collisions are very +hard to obtain). Some even try to generate hash results in a way that the +duration to calculate hashes cannot be used to obtain information from the data +(such as if it contains more 0s than 1s, etc.) +</p> + +</body> +</section> +<section> +<title>Hashes in integrity validation</title> +<body> + +<p> +Integrity validation services are often based on hash generation and validation. +Tools such as <uri link="http://www.tripwire.org/">tripwire</uri> or <uri +link="http://aide.sourceforge.net/">AIDE</uri> generate hashes of files and +directories on your systems and then ask you to store them safely. When you want +the integrity of your systems checked, you provide this information to the +program (most likely in a read-only manner since you don't want this list to +be modified while validating) which then recalculates the hashes of the files +and compares them with the given list. Any changes in files are detected and can +be reported to you (or the administrator). +</p> + +<p> +A popular hash functions is SHA-1 (which you can generate and validate using the +<c>sha1sum</c> command) which gained momentum after MD5 (using <c>md5sum</c>) +was found to be less secure (nowadays collisions in MD5 are easy to generate). +SHA-2 also exists (but is less popular than SHA-1) and can be played with using +the commands <c>sha224sum</c>, <c>sha256sum</c>, <c>sha384sum</c> and +<c>sha512sum</c>. +</p> + +<pre caption="Generating the SHA-1 sum of a file"> +~$ <i>sha1sum ~/Downloads/pastie-4301043.rb</i> +6b9b4e0946044ec752992c2afffa7be103c2e748 /home/swift/Downloads/pastie-4301043.rb +</pre> + +</body> +</section> +<section> +<title>Hashes are a means, not a solution</title> +<body> + +<p> +Hashes, in the field of integrity validation, are a means to compare data and +integrity in a relatively fast way. However, by itself hashes cannot be used to +provide integrity assurance towards the administrator. Take the use of +<c>sha1sum</c> by itself for instance. +</p> + +<p> +You are not guaranteed that the <c>sha1sum</c> application behaves correctly +(and as such has or hasn't been tampered with). You can't use <c>sha1sum</c> +against itself since malicious modifications of the command can easily just +return (print out) the expected SHA-1 sum rather than the real one. A way to +thwart this is to provide the binary together with the hash values on read-only +media. +</p> + +<p> +But then you're still not certain that it is that application that is executed: +a modified system might have you think it is executing that application, but +instead is using a different application. To provide this level of trust, you +need to get insurance from a higher-positioned, trusted service that the right +application is being ran. Running with a trusted kernel helps here (but might +not provide 100% closure on it) but you most likely need assistance from the +hardware (we will talk about the Trusted Platform Module later). +</p> + +<p> +Likewise, you are not guaranteed that it is still your file with hash results +that is being used to verify the integrity of a file. Another file (with +modified content) may be bind-mounted on top of it. To support integrity +validation with a trusted information source, some solutions use HMAC digests +instead of plain hashes. +</p> + +<p> +Finally, checksums should not only be taken on file level, but also its +attributes (which are often used to provide access controls or even toggle +particular security measures on/off on a file, such as is the case with PaX +markings), directories (holding information about directory updates such +as file adds or removals) and privileges. These are things that a program like +<c>sha1sum</c> doesn't offer (but tools like AIDE do). +</p> + +</body> +</section> +</chapter> + +<chapter> +<title>Hash-based Message Authentication Codes</title> +<section> +<title>Trusting the hash result</title> +<body> + +<p> +In order to trust a hash result, some solutions use HMAC digests instead. An +HMAC digest combines a regular hash function (and its properties) with a +a secret cryptographic key. As such, the function generates the hash of the +content of a file together with the secret cryptographic key. This not only +provides integrity validation of the file, but also a signature telling the +verification tool that the hash was made by a trusted application (one that +knows the cryptographic key) in the past and has not been tampered with. +</p> + +<p> +By using HMAC digests, malicious users will find it more difficult to modify +code and then present a "fake" hash results file since the user cannot reproduce +the secret cryptographic key that needs to be added to generate this new hash +result. When you see terms like <e>HMAC-SHA1</e> it means that a SHA-1 hash +result is used together with a cryptographic key. +</p> + +</body> +</section> +<section> +<title>Managing the keys</title> +<body> + +<p> +Using keys to "protect" the hash results introduces another level of complexity: +how do you properly, securely store the keys and access them only when needed? +You cannot just embed the key in the hash list (since a tampered system might +read it out when you are verifying the system, generate its own results file and +have you check against that instead). Likewise you can't just embed the key in +the application itself, because a tampered system might just read out the +application binary to find the key (and once compromised, you might need to +rebuild the application completely with a new key). +</p> + +<p> +You might be tempted to just provide the key as a command-line argument, but +then again you are not certain that a malicious user is idling on your system, +waiting to capture this valuable information from the output of <c>ps</c>, etc. +</p> + +<p> +Again rises the need to trust a higher-level component. When you trust the +kernel, you might be able to use the kernel key ring for this. +</p> + +</body> +</section> +</chapter> + +<chapter> +<title>Using private/public key cryptography</title> +<section> +<title>Validating integrity using public keys</title> +<body> + +<p> +One way to work around the vulnerability of having the malicious user getting +hold of the secret key is to not rely on the key for the authentication of the +hash result in the first place when verifying the integrity of the system. This +can be accomplised if you, instead of using just an HMAC, you also encrypt HMAC +digest with a private key. +</p> + +<p> +During validation of the hashes, you decrypt the HMAC with the public key (not +the private key) and use this to generate the HMAC digests again to validate. +</p> + +<p> +In this approach, an attacker cannot forge a fake HMAC since forgery requires +access to the private key, and the private key is never used on the system to +validate signatures. And as long as no collisions occur, he also cannot reuse +the encrypted HMAC values (which you could consider to be a replay attack). +</p> + +</body> +</section> +<section> +<title>Ensuring the key integrity</title> +<body> + +<p> +Of course, this still requires that the public key is not modifyable by a +tampered system: a fake list of hash results can be made using a different +private key, and the moment the tool wants to decrypt the encrypted values, the +tampered system replaces the public key with its own public key, and the system +is again vulnerable. +</p> + +</body> +</section> +</chapter> + +<chapter> +<title>Trust chain</title> +<section> +<title>Handing over trust</title> +<body> + +<p> +As you've noticed from the methods and services above, you always need to have +something you trust and that you can build on. If you trust nothing, you can't +validate anything since nothing can be trusted to return a valid response. And +to trust something means you also want to have confidence that that system +itself uses trusted resources. +</p> + +<p> +For many users, the hardware level is something they trust. After all, as long +as no burglar has come in the house and tampered with the hardware itself, it is +reasonable to expect that the hardware is still the same. In effect, the users +trust that the physical protection of their house is sufficient for them. +</p> + +<p> +For companies, the physical protection of the working environment is not +sufficient for ultimate trust. They want to make sure that the hardware is not +tampered with (or different hardware is suddenly used), specifically when that +company uses laptops instead of (less portable) workstations. +</p> + +<p> +The more you don't trust, the more things you need to take care of in order to +be confident that the system is not tampered with. In the Gentoo Hardened +Integrity subproject we will use the following "order" of resources: +</p> + +<ul> + <li> + <e>System root-owned files and root-running processes</e>. In most cases + and most households, properly configured and protected systems will trust + root-owned files and processes. Any request for integrity validation of + the system is usually applied against user-provided files (no-one tampered + with the user account or specific user files) and not against the system + itself. + </li> + <li> + <e>Operating system kernel</e> (in our case the Linux kernel). Although some + precautions need to be taken, a properly configured and protected kernel can + provide a higher trust level. Integrity validation on kernel level can offer + a higher trust in the systems' integrity, although you must be aware that + most kernels still reside on the system itself. + </li> + <li> + <e>Live environments</e>. A bootable (preferably) read-only medium can be + used to boot up a validation environment that scans and verifies the + integrity of the system-under-investigation. In this case, even tampered + kernel boot images can be detected, and by taking proper precautions when + running the validation (such as ensuring no network access is enabled from + the boot up until the final compliance check has occurred) you can make + yourself confident of the state of the entire system. + </li> + <li> + <e>Hypervisor level</e>. Hypervisors are by many organizations seen as + trusted resources (the isolation of a virtual environment is hard to break + out of). Integrity validation on the hypervisor level can therefor provide + confidence, especially when "chaining trusts": the hypervisor first + validates the kernel to boot, and then boots this (now trusted) kernel which + loads up the rest of the system. + </li> + <li> + <e>Hardware level</e>. Whereas hypervisors are still "just software", you + can lift up trust up to the hardware level and use the hardware-offered + integrity features to provide you with confidence that the system you are + about to boot has not been tampered with. + </li> +</ul> + +<p> +In the Gentoo Hardened Integrity subproject, we aim to eventually support all +these levels (and perhaps more) to provide you as a user the tools and methods +you need to validate the integrity of your system, up to the point that you +trust. The less you trust, the more complex a trust chain might become to +validate (and manage), but we will not limit our research and support to a +single technology (or chain of technologies). +</p> + +<p> +Chaining trust is an important aspect to keep things from becoming too complex +and unmanageable. It also allows users to just "drop in" at the level of trust +they feel is sufficient, rather than requiring technologies for higher levels. +</p> + +<p> +For instance: +</p> + +<ul> + <li> + A hardware component that you trust (like a <e>Trusted Platform Module</e> + or a specific BIOS-supported functionality) verifies the integrity of the + boot regions on your disk. When ok, it passes control over to the + bootloader. + </li> + <li> + The bootloader now validates the integrity of its configuration and of the + files (kernel and initramfs) it is told to boot up. If it checks out, it + boots the kernel and hands over control to this kernel. + </li> + <li> + The kernel, together with the initial ram file system, verifies the + integrity of the system components (and for instance SELinux policy) before + the initial ram system changes to the real system and boots up the + (verified) init system. + </li> + <li> + The (root-running) init system validates the integrity of the services it + wants to start before handing over control of the system to the user. + </li> +</ul> + +<p> +An even longer chain can be seen with hypervisors: +</p> + +<ul> + <li> + Hardware validates boot loader + </li> + <li> + Boot loader validates hypervisor kernel and system + </li> + <li> + Hypervisor validates kernel(s) of the images (or the entire images) + </li> + <li> + Hypervisor-managed virtual environment starts the image + </li> + <li> + ... + </li> +</ul> + +</body> +</section> +<section> +<title>Integrity on serviced platforms</title> +<body> + +<p> +Sometimes you cannot trust higher positioned components, but still want to be +assured that your service is not tampered with. An example would be when you are +hosting a system in a remote, non-accessible data center or when you manage an +image hosted by a virtualized hosting provider (I don't want to say "cloud" +here, but it fits). +</p> + +<p> +In these cases, you want a level of assurance that your own image has not been +tampered with while being offline (you can imagine manipulating the guest image, +injecting trojans or other backdoors, and then booting the image) or even while +running the system. Instead of trusting the higher components, you try to deal +with a level of distrust that you want to manage. +</p> + +<p> +Providing you with some confidence at this level too is our goal within the +Gentoo Hardened Integrity subproject. +</p> + +</body> +</section> +<section> +<title>From measurement to protection</title> +<body> + +<p> +When dealing with integrity (and trust chains), the idea behind the top-down +trust chain is that higher level components first measure the integrity of the +next component, validate (and take appropriate action) and then hand over +control to this component. This is what we call <e>protection</e> or +<e>integrity enforcement</e> of resources. +</p> + +<p> +If the system cannot validate the integrity, or the system is too volatile to +enforce this integrity from a higher level, it is necessary to provide a trusted +method for other services to validate the integrity. In this case, the system +<e>attests</e> the state of the underlying component(s) towards a third party +service, which <e>appraises</e> this state against a known "good" value. +</p> + +<p> +In the case of our HMAC-based checks, there is no enforcement of integrity of +the files, but the tool itself attests the state of the resources by generating +new HMAC digests and validating (appraising) it against the list of HMAC digests +it took before. +</p> + +</body> +</section> +</chapter> + +<chapter> +<title>An implementation: the Trusted Computing Group functionality</title> +<section> +<title>Trusted Platform Module</title> +<body> + +</body> +</section> +</chapter> + +</guide> |