Update HTML code in descriptions, anonimize text

1 files changed, 401 insertions, 244 deletions

diff --git a/xml/SCAP/gentoo-xccdf.xml b/xml/SCAP/gentoo-xccdf.xml
index 6b3172e..e51a0ab 100644
--- a/xml/SCAP/gentoo-xccdf.xml
+++ b/xml/SCAP/gentoo-xccdf.xml
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
 <Benchmark xmlns="http://checklists.nist.gov/xccdf/1.2" xmlns:h="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_benchmark_gentoo-20130917-1" xsi:schemaLocation="http://checklists.nist.gov/xccdf/1.2 xccdf-1.2.xsd" resolved="0">
-  <status date="2013-09-17">draft</status>
+  <status date="2013-12-20">draft</status>
   <title>Gentoo Security Benchmark</title>
   <description>
     This benchmarks helps people in improving their system configuration to be
     more resilient against attacks and vulnerabilities.
   </description>
   <platform idref="cpe:/o:gentoo:linux"/>
-  <version>20130917.1</version>
+  <version>20131220.1</version>
   <model system="urn:xccdf:scoring:default" />
   <model system="urn:xccdf:scoring:flat" />
   <model system="urn:xccdf:scoring:flat-unweighted" />
@@ -17,15 +17,27 @@
       This profile extends the default server profile by including tests that 
       are more intensive to run on a system. Tests such as full file system
       scans to find world-writable files or directories have an otherwise too
-      large impact on the performance of a server.
+      large impact on the performance of a server. Tests include scripted
+      validationn.
     </description>
   </Profile>
-  <Profile id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_profile_default">
-    <title>Default server setup settings</title>
+  <Profile id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_profile_intensive-oval" extends="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_profile_default-oval">
+    <title>Intensive validation profile (non-scripted)</title>
+    <description>
+      This profile extends the default server profile by including tests that 
+      are more intensive to run on a system. Tests such as full file system
+      scans to find world-writable files or directories have an otherwise too
+      large impact on the performance of a server. Tests do not include
+      scripted validation.
+    </description>
+  </Profile>
+  <Profile id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_profile_default-oval">
+    <title>Default server setup settings (non-scripted)</title>
     <description>
       In this profile, we verify common settings for Gentoo Linux
       configurations. The tests that are enabled in this profile can be ran
-      without visibly impacting the performance of the system.
+      without visibly impacting the performance of the system. No scripted
+      checks are executed.
     </description>
     <!-- The /tmp location is a separate file system -->
     <select idref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_partition-tmp" selected="true" />
@@ -59,8 +71,6 @@
     <select idref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_partition-tmp-noexec" selected="true" />
      <!-- The /dev/shm partition is mounted with noexec -->
     <select idref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_partition-devshm-noexec" selected="true" />
-    <!-- The hardened toolchain must be installated and used -->
-    <select idref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_installation-toolchain-hardened" selected="true" />
     <!-- Kernel quota support must be enabled -->
     <select idref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_kernel-quota" selected="true" />
     <!-- No telnetd process is running -->
@@ -75,59 +85,75 @@
     <select idref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_hostsallow-exists" selected="true" />
     <!-- Verify that /etc/at/at.allow exists -->
     <select idref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_atallow-exists" selected="true" />
- 
+  </Profile>
+  <Profile id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_profile_default" extends="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_profile_default-oval">
+    <title>Default server setup settings</title>
+    <description>
+      In this profile, common settings for Gentoo Linux configurations are validated. 
+      The tests can be ran without visibly impacting the performance of the system, and
+      also includes the scripted evaluation checks (SCE).
+    </description>
+    <!-- The hardened toolchain must be installated and used -->
+    <select idref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_installation-toolchain-hardened" selected="true" />
   </Profile>
   <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_intro">
     <title>Introduction</title>
     <description>
+      <h:p>
       Since years, Gentoo Linux has a Gentoo Security Handbook
       which provides a good insight in secure system
       configuration for a Gentoo systems. Although this is important, an
       improved method for describing and tuning a systems' security state has
       emerged: SCAP, or the <h:em>Security Content Automation Protocol</h:em>.
-      <h:br />
-      <h:br />
+      </h:p>
+      <h:p>
       As such, this benchmark is an update on the security
       handbook, including both the in-depth explanation of settings as well as
       the means to validate if a system complies with this or not. Now, during
-      the development of this benchmark document, we did not include all
-      information from the Gentoo Security Handbook as some of the settings are
-      specific to a service that is not all that default on a Gentoo Linux
-      system. Although these settings are important as well, it is our believe
-      that this is best done in separate benchmarks for those services instead.
-      <h:br />
-      <h:br />
+      the development of this benchmark document, not include all
+      information from the Gentoo Security Handbook is included as some of the
+      settings are specific to a service that is not all that default on a
+      Gentoo Linux system or sufficiently separate that can benefit other
+      distributions as well. Although these settings are important as well, it is
+      best done in separate benchmarks for those services instead.
+      </h:p>
+      <h:p>
       Where applicable, this benchmark will refer to a different hardening guide
       for specific purposes (such as the Hardening OpenSSH benchmark).
+      </h:p>
     </description>
     <reference href="http://www.gentoo.org/doc/en/security/security-handbook.xml">Gentoo
     Security Handbook</reference>
     <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_intro-security">
       <title>This is no security policy</title>
       <description>
+        <h:p>
         It is <h:em>very important</h:em> to realize that this document is not a
         policy. There is no obligation to follow this to make a secure system
-        nor should everything in this document be agreed upon. What we document is
+        nor should everything in this document be agreed upon. This document is
         a set of common best practices with the explanation (why is it a best practice)
         and method (how to implement the best practice).
-        <h:br />
-        <h:br />
+        </h:p>
+        <h:p>
         The purpose of this document is to guide readers in their quest to hardening
         their systems.  It will provide pointers that could help in deciding
         particular configuration settings and will do this hopefully using
         sufficient background information to allow readers to make a good choice.
-        <h:br />
-        <h:br />
+	</h:p>
+	<h:p>
         Readers might find settings they don't agree with. That's fine, but
         if there is disagreement about <h:em>why</h:em> it is documented, we would
         like to hear it so we can update the guide accordingly.
+	</h:p>
       </description>
     </Group>
     <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_intro-scap">
       <title>A little more about SCAP and OVAL</title>
       <description>
+        <h:p>
         Within SCAP, NIST has defined some new standards of which XCCDF and OVAL
         are notably important in light of this guide.
+	</h:p>
         <h:ul>
           <h:li>
             XCCDF (Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format) is
@@ -138,74 +164,104 @@
             and validate system settings
           </h:li>
         </h:ul>
-        <h:br />
+        <h:p>
         Thanks to the OVAL and XCCDF standards, a security engineer can now describe
         how the state of a system should be configured, how this can be checked
         automatically and even report on these settings. Furthermore, within the
         description, the engineer can make "profiles" of different states (such as
         a profile for a workstation, server (generic), webserver, LDAP server,
         ...) and reusing the states (rules) identified in a more global scope.
+	</h:p>
       </description>
     </Group>
     <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_intro-using">
       <title>Using this guide</title>
       <description>
+        <h:p>
         This guide is generated from SCAP content (more specifically, the XCCDF document)
         using <h:b>openscap</h:b>, a free software implementation for handling SCAP content.
         Within Gentoo, the package <h:code>app-forensics/openscap</h:code> provides the tools,
         and the following command is used to generate the HTML output:
-        <h:br />
-        <h:pre># <h:b>oscap xccdf generate guide gentoo-xccdf.xml &gt; output.html</h:b>
-        </h:pre>
-        <h:br />
+	</h:p>
+        <h:pre>
+# <h:b>oscap xccdf generate guide gentoo-xccdf.xml &gt; output.html</h:b></h:pre>
+	<h:p>
         Secondly, together with this XCCDF XML, an OVAL XML file is made available.
         The two files combined allow OVAL interpreters to automatically validate
         various settings as documented in the benchmark.
-        <h:br />
-        <h:br />
+	</h:p>
+	<h:p>
+	Finally, if certain tests are not available in OVAL yet, scripts are provided
+	that can be executed through the SCE (Script Check Engine) support in openscap.
+	As scripts are not guaranteed to have no impact on the system (or leave traces),
+	<h:code>-oval</h:code> profiles are available that only enable the OVAL (and not SCE)
+	checks.
+	</h:p>
+	<h:p>
         To validate the tests, the following commands can be used:
-        <h:pre># <h:b>oscap xccdf eval --profile xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_profile_default gentoo-xccdf.xml</h:b></h:pre>
-        <h:br />
+	</h:p>
+        <h:pre>
+# <h:b>export PROFILE="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_profile_default"</h:b>
+# <h:b>oscap xccdf eval --profile ${PROFILE} gentoo-xccdf.xml</h:b></h:pre>
+	<h:p>
         To generate a full report in HTML as well, use the next command:
-        <h:pre># <h:b>oscap xccdf eval --profile xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_profile_default --results xccdf-results.xml --report report.html gentoo-xccdf.xml</h:b></h:pre>
-        <h:br />
-        <h:br />
+	</h:p>
+        <h:pre>
+# <h:b>oscap xccdf eval --profile ${PROFILE} --results xccdf-results.xml \
+  --report report.html gentoo-xccdf.xml</h:b></h:pre>
+	<h:p>
         Finally, this benchmark will suggest some settings that do not reflect the
         will of the reader. That is perfectly fine - even more, some settings might even
         raise eyebrows left and right. This document will explain the reasoning behind
         the settings but deviations are always possible. If that is the case,
         disable the rules in the XCCDF document or, better yet, create a new profile
         and only refer to the tests that are required.
+	</h:p>
       </description>
     </Group>
     <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_intro-profiles">
       <title>Available XCCDF Profiles</title>
       <description>
+        <h:p>
         As mentioned earlier, the XCCDF document supports multiple profiles. For the time
         being, two profiles are defined:
-        <h:br />
+	</h:p>
         <h:ul>
           <h:li>
-            The <em>default</em> profile (xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_profile_default) contains
+            The <h:em>default</h:em> profile (xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_profile_default) contains
             tests that are quick to validate
           </h:li>
+	  <h:li>
+	    The <h:em>default-oval</h:em> profile (xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_profile_default-oval)
+	    is like the default one, but does not call any other checker than OVAL
+	    (so no scripts).
+	  </h:li>
           <h:li>
-            The <em>intensive</em> profile (xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_profile_intensive)
+            The <h:em>intensive</h:em> profile (xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_profile_intensive)
             contains all tests, including those that take a while (for instance because they
             perform full file system scans)
           </h:li>
+	  <h:li>
+	    The <h:em>intensive-oval</h:em> profile (xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_profile_intensive-oval)
+	    is like the intensive one, but does not call any other checker than OVAL
+	    (so no scripts).
+	  </h:li>
         </h:ul>
+	<h:p>
         Substitute the profile information in the commands above with the required profile.
+	</h:p>
       </description>
     </Group>
     <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_intro-weights">
       <title>About the rule weights</title>
       <description>
+        <h:p>
         Within this guide, weights are assigned to tests to give some importance to
         the rule (higher weight is more important) as well as a severity.
-        <h:br />
-        <h:br />
+	</h:p>
+	<h:p>
         The severity is one of the following:
+	</h:p>
         <h:ul>
           <h:li>
             <h:em>high</h:em> constitutes a grave or critical problem. A rule with this severity
@@ -227,29 +283,31 @@
             does not mean failure to comply with the document itself.
           </h:li>
         </h:ul>
+	<h:p>
         It is important to understand though that rules with a low severity can still lead to 
         grave security problems if they are not met. Chaining of vulnerabilities or
         misconfiguration can still lead to full system compromise.
-        <h:br />
-        <h:br />
+	</h:p>
+	<h:p>
         For this reason, weights are added to rules as well. A higher weight has a more
         severe potential impact.
-        <h:br />
-        <h:br />
-        Weights are the CVSS score that the author assumes is the case for a misconfiguration.
+	</h:p>
+	<h:p>
+        Weights are the CVSS (or CCSS) score that is thought to be the case for a misconfiguration.
         They are calculated by NVD's CVSS calculator. Each rule is scored individually; a 
         "chain" of misconfigurations might lead to a significantly higher issue, but this would
         make it very hard to make proper scoring. 
-        <h:br />
-        <h:br />
+	</h:p>
+	<h:p>
         As an example, take the rule that says <h:code>/var</h:code> has to be on its own
         partition. The metrics we fill in in the calculator are currently based on the risk
         that the root file system is filled (no more free space), which can halt the system.
+	</h:p>
         <h:ul>
           <h:li>
             The <h:em>related exploit range</h:em> (access vector) is "Local", because this is
             by itself not exploitable remotely - unless of course certain services are running
-            that can fill up <h:code>/var</h:code>, but we do not take such assumptions.
+            that can fill up <h:code>/var</h:code>, but such assumptions are not taken.
           </h:li>
           <h:li>
             The <h:em>attack complexity</h:em> (access complexity) is "Low", as all that is
@@ -270,18 +328,21 @@
             The <h:em>availability impact</h:em> is "Complete" (system crash or halt).
           </h:li>
         </h:ul>
+	<h:p>
         This results in the CVSS base score of 4.6. The environmental score metrics and
         temporal score metrics are ignored as those are too specific for environments
         and organizations.
+	</h:p>
       </description>
       <reference href="https://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm?calculator&amp;version=2">NVD CVSS calculator</reference>
+      <reference href="http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/ir7502/nistir-7502_CCSS.pdf">The Common Configuration Scoring System (PDF)</reference>
     </Group>
   </Group>
   <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_preinstallation">
-    <title>Before we start</title>
+    <title>Before startng</title>
     <description>
-      Before we start deploying Gentoo Linux and start hardening it, it is wise
-      to take a step back and think about what we want to accomplish. Setting
+      Before starting to deploy Gentoo Linux and start hardening it, it is wise
+      to take a step back and think about what to accomplish. Setting
       up a more secured Gentoo Linux isn't a goal, but a means to reach
       something. Most likely the system will become a Gentoo Linux powered server.
       What is this server for? Where will it be hosted? What services are scheduled to run
@@ -290,47 +351,51 @@
     <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_preinstallation-architecturing">
       <title>Infrastructure architecturing</title>
       <description>
+        <h:p>
         When considering the entire IT architecture, many architecturing
         frameworks exist to write down and further design infrastructure.
         There are very elaborate ones, like TOGAF (The Open Group Architecture
         Framework), but smaller ones exist as well.
-        <h:br />
-        <h:br />
+	</h:p>
+	<h:p>
         A well written and maintained infrastructure architecture helps to 
         position new services or consider the impact of changes on existing
         components.
-        <h:br />
-        <h:br />
+	</h:p>
+	<h:p>
         Security is about reducing risks, not about harassing people or making
         work for a system administrator harder. And reducing risks also means
         that a clear eye needs to be kept on the architecture and all its
         components. If there is no knowledge as to what is being integrated, where
         it is going to be installed or why, then hardening by itself will probably not
         do much to the secure state of the system.
+	</h:p>
       </description>
     </Group>
     <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_preinstallation-requirements">
       <title>Mapping requirements</title>
       <description>
+        <h:p>
         When designing a service, we need to take both functional and
         non-functional requirements into account. That does sound like
         overshooting for a simple server installation, but it is not. Is
         auditing considered? Where should the audit logs be sent to? What
         about authentication? Centrally managed, or manually set? And the server,
         will it only host a particular service, or will it provide several services?
-        <h:br />
-        <h:br />
+	</h:p>
+	<h:p>
         When hosting multiple services on the same server, make sure that the
         server is positioned within the network on an acceptable segment. It is
         not safe to host central LDAP infrastructure on the same system as
         a web server that is facing the Internet.
+	</h:p>
       </description>
       <reference href="https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/rational/library/4706.html">IBM DeveloperWorks article on "Capturing Architectural Requirements"</reference>
     </Group>
     <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_preinstallation-nonsoftware">
       <title>Non-software security concerns</title>
       <description>
-        From the next chapter onwards, our focus will be on the software side
+        From the next chapter onwards, the focus will be on the software side
         hardening. There are of course also non-software concerns that need to be
         taken care of.
       </description>
@@ -338,17 +403,18 @@
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_preinstallation-nonsoftware-physical">
         <title>Physical security</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           Make sure that the system is only accessible (physically) by trusted
           people. Fully hardening a system, only to have a malicious person
           take out the harddisk and run away with the confidential data is not
-          something we want to experience.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+          something fun to experience.
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           When physical security cannot be guaranteed (like with laptops), make
           sure that theft of the device only results in the loss of the hardware
           and not of the data and software on it (take backups!), and also that the
           data on it cannot be read by unauthorized people.
-          We will describe disk encryption later.
+	  </h:p>
         </description>
         <reference
         href="http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/awareness/data-center-physical-security-checklist_416">Data Center Physical Security Checklist (SANS, PDF)</reference>
@@ -356,16 +422,18 @@
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_preinstallation-nonsoftware-policies">
         <title>Policies and contractual agreements</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           Create or validate the security policies in the organization. This is
           not only as a stick (against internal people who might want to abuse
           their powers) but also to document and describe why certain decisions
           are made (both architecturally as otherwise).
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           Make sure that the reasoning for the guidelines is clear. If the policies ever
           need to be adjusted towards new environments or concepts (like "bring your own
           device") having the reasons for the (old) guidelines documented will make it much
           easier to write new ones.
+	  </h:p>
         </description>
         <reference
         href="http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/policyissues/technical-writing-security-policies-easy-steps_492">Technical Writing for IT Security Policies in Five Easy Steps (SANS, PDF)</reference>
@@ -377,10 +445,9 @@
   <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_installation">
     <title>Installation configuration</title>
     <description>
-      Let's focus now on the OS hardening. Gentoo Linux allows us to update various
-      parts of the system after installation, but it might be interesting to
-      consider the following aspects during (or before) installation if we do not want
-      to risk a huge migration project later.
+      Gentoo Linux allows us to update various parts of the system after installation,
+      but it might be interesting to consider the following aspects during (or before)
+      installation to not risk a huge migration project later.
     </description>
     <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_installation-storage">
       <title>Storage configuration</title>
@@ -403,12 +470,14 @@
         <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_installation-storage-partitioning-separate">
           <title>Separate file systems for important locations</title>
           <description>
+	    <h:p>
             Having a separate file system for important locations has several advantages, but
-            we need to weigh those advantages against the disadvantages of separate file
+            those advantages need to be weighted against the disadvantages of separate file
             systems.
-            <h:br />
-            <h:br />
-            Let's start with the disadvantages:
+	    </h:p>
+	    <h:p>
+            These disadvantages are:
+	    </h:p>
             <h:ul>
               <h:li>
                 Separate file systems mean that better disk space control is needed
@@ -426,7 +495,9 @@
                 (such as creating an initial ram file system).
               </h:li>
             </h:ul>
+	    <h:p>
             The advantages on the other hand:
+	    </h:p>
             <h:ul>
               <h:li>
                 A sudden disk space growth will eventually be stopped by the limits of the
@@ -446,8 +517,10 @@
                 for a particular file system.
               </h:li>
             </h:ul>
+	    <h:p>
             Considering these pros and cons, it is recommended to have at least the following
             file system locations to be on a different file system:
+	    </h:p>
             <h:ul>
               <h:li>
                 <h:code>/tmp</h:code> as this is a world-writable location and requires
@@ -488,7 +561,7 @@
             </h:ul>
           </description>
           <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_partition-tmp" selected="false" severity="medium" weight="4.6">
-            <title>Test if /tmp is a separate file system</title>
+            <title>/tmp is a separate file system</title>
             <fixtext>
               Create a file system for <h:code>/tmp</h:code>; make sure it is added in
               the <h:code>/etc/fstab</h:code> file and reboot the system.
@@ -498,7 +571,7 @@
             </check>
           </Rule>
           <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_partition-var" selected="false" severity="medium" weight="4.6">
-            <title>Test if /var is a separate file system</title>
+            <title>/var is a separate file system</title>
             <fixtext>
               Create a file system for <h:code>/var</h:code>; make sure it is added in
               the <h:code>/etc/fstab</h:code> file and reboot the system.
@@ -508,7 +581,7 @@
             </check>
           </Rule>
           <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_partition-varlog" selected="false" severity="low" weight="2.1">
-            <title>Test if /var/log is a separate file system</title>
+            <title>/var/log is a separate file system</title>
             <fixtext>
               Create a file system for <h:code>/var/log</h:code>; make sure it is added in
               the <h:code>/etc/fstab</h:code> file and reboot the system.
@@ -518,7 +591,7 @@
             </check>
           </Rule>
           <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_partition-varlogaudit" selected="false" severity="low" weight="2.1">
-            <title>Test if /var/log/audit is a separate file system</title>
+            <title>/var/log/audit is a separate file system</title>
             <fixtext>
               Create a file system for <h:code>/var/log/audit</h:code>; make sure it is added in
               the <h:code>/etc/fstab</h:code> file and reboot the system.
@@ -528,7 +601,7 @@
             </check>
           </Rule>
           <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_partition-home" selected="false" severity="medium" weight="4.6">
-            <title>Test if /home is a separate file system</title>
+            <title>/home is a separate file system</title>
             <fixtext>
               Create a file system for <h:code>/home</h:code>; make sure it is added in
               the <h:code>/etc/fstab</h:code> file and reboot the system.
@@ -538,7 +611,7 @@
             </check>
           </Rule>
           <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_partition-vartmp" selected="false" severity="low" weight="2.1">
-            <title>Test if /var/tmp is a separate file system</title>
+            <title>/var/tmp is a separate file system</title>
             <fixtext>
               Create a file system for <h:code>/var/tmp</h:code>; make sure it is added in
               the <h:code>/etc/fstab</h:code> file and reboot the system.
@@ -553,11 +626,11 @@
     <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_installation-toolchain">
       <title>Use a Hardened Toolchain</title>
       <description>
+        <h:p>
         When Gentoo is installed, use the hardened stages and hardened toolchain.
         The hardened toolchain includes additional security patches, such as
         support for non-executable program stacks and buffer overflow detection.
-        <h:br />
-        <h:br />
+	</h:p>
         <h:ul>
           <h:li>
             <h:em>Position Independent Executables (PIE)</h:em> and <h:em>Position Independent
@@ -572,11 +645,14 @@
             having the overflow succeed.
           </h:li>
         </h:ul>
+	<h:p>
         During installation, make sure that the <h:em>default</h:em> hardened
         toolchain is selected, not one of the <h:code>-hardenedno*</h:code> as
         those are toolchains where specific settings are disabled. The
         <h:code>-vanilla</h:code> one is a toolchain with no hardened patches.
-        <h:pre># <h:b>gcc-config -l</h:b>
+	</h:p>
+        <h:pre>
+# <h:b>gcc-config -l</h:b>
  [1] x86_64-pc-linux-gnu-4.4.5 *
  [2] x86_64-pc-linux-gnu-4.4.5-hardenednopie
  [3] x86_64-pc-linux-gnu-4.4.5-hardenednopie.gcc-config-ref
@@ -585,7 +661,7 @@
  [6] x86_64-pc-linux-gnu-4.4.5-vanilla</h:pre>
       </description>
       <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_installation-toolchain-hardened" selected="false" severity="low" weight="0.0">
-        <title>Test if the hardened toolchain is used</title>
+        <title>The hardened toolchain is used</title>
         <fixtext fixref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_installation-toolchain-hardened">
           Use a hardened Gentoo profile and select the default compiler (not vanilla
           nor any of the hardenedno* ones).
@@ -596,27 +672,6 @@
         </check>
       </Rule>
     </Group> <!-- installation-toolchain -->
-    <!-- 
-    <Group id="gt-installation-selinux">
-      <title>Use a Mandatory Access Control system</title>
-      <description>
-        Linux uses, by default, what is called a <h:em>Discretionary Access Control</h:em>
-        system. This means, amongst other things, that a user can control which files others
-        can access, but also that he is able to leak information towards other users.
-        <h:br />
-        <h:br />
-        With a <h:em>Mandatory Access Control</h:em> system in place, the security administrator
-        of a system defines security policies to which the entire system should adhere to. Users
-        then can "play" within the defined fields of this policy, but cannot extend this policy themselves.
-        <h:br />
-        <h:br />
-        Linux supports a few of these MAC systems. SELinux is a popular one, grSecurity RBAC system
-        is another, TOMOYO exists as well, etc. It is advisable to use such a MAC system, but its
-        configuration and testing of these settings are beyond the scope of this benchmark for now.
-      </description>
-      <reference href="http://hardened.gentoo.org/selinux">Gentoo Hardened SELinux project page</reference>
-    </Group>
-    -->
   </Group> <!-- installation -->
   <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system">
     <title>System settings</title>
@@ -634,24 +689,26 @@
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-fs-mountoptions">
         <title>Appropriate mount options for the file systems</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           Non-root file systems should be mounted with the <h:em>nodev</h:em> mount option.
           This mount option ensures that device files are not allowed on these file systems
           (and if they are there, they are ignored by the Linux kernel for any device
           operation).
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           Having device files on non-root file systems could allow unauthorized people access
           to sensitive data (for instance when having a readable raw disk device files) or
           even manipulate the system.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           The privilege to create special device files (beyond regular sockets) such as
           character and block device files is handled through the CAP_MKNOD capability
           which is not granted to regular users. As such, the risk is when more privileged
           users or processes are tricked to create such device files.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           This setting is appropriate for file systems such as (non-exhaustive list):
+	  </h:p>
           <h:ul>
             <h:li>
               <h:code>/var</h:code> (as it is recommended to be a separate file system)
@@ -669,10 +726,12 @@
               <h:code>/tmp</h:code> (as it is recommended to be a separate file system)
             </h:li>
           </h:ul>
+	  <h:p>
           Specific file systems should also be mounted with the <h:em>nosuid</h:em> mount
           option. This prevents setuid binaries to run as a different user when hosted
           on this file system. As there are several locations where setuid binaries might
           be needed, this only affects particular file systems:
+	  </h:p>
           <h:ul>
             <h:li>
               The <h:code>/tmp</h:code> file system should not be used for setuid binaries
@@ -687,19 +746,21 @@
               (shared memory region).
             </h:li>
           </h:ul>
+	  <h:p>
           Specific file systems should also be mounted with the <h:em>noexec</h:em> mount
           option. This prevents some automated attacks to execute certain payload (exploits)
           from these locations.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           This is just one of the many "layers" though, as executing payload can still be
           done using different methods. For instance, scripts can be invoked through the
           shell itself (rather than directly) and in the past, binaries could even be
           executed through the <h:code>ld-linux.so</h:code> binary (although this has
           been fixed).
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           File systems for which <h:em>noexec</h:em> is recommended are:
+	  </h:p>
           <h:ul>
             <h:li>
               The <h:code>/tmp</h:code> file system as it is a popular target to store exploit
@@ -716,7 +777,7 @@
              Multiple authentication (one to create device file, one to log on)
         -->
         <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_partition-var-nodev" selected="false" severity="low" weight="5.9">
-          <title>Test if /var is mounted with nodev</title>
+          <title>/var is mounted with nodev</title>
           <fixtext fixref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_partition-var-nodev">Mount /var with nodev mount option</fixtext>
           <fix id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_partition-var-nodev"
             system="urn:xccdf:fix:system:commands"
@@ -728,7 +789,7 @@ mount -o remount,nodev /var
           </check>
         </Rule>
         <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_partition-varlog-nodev" selected="false" severity="low" weight="5.9">
-          <title>Test if /var/log is mounted with nodev</title>
+          <title>/var/log is mounted with nodev</title>
           <fixtext fixref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_partition-varlog-nodev">Mount /var/log with nodev mount option</fixtext>
           <fix id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_partition-varlog-nodev"
             system="urn:xccdf:fix:system:commands"
@@ -740,7 +801,7 @@ mount -o remount,nodev /var/log
           </check>
         </Rule>
         <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_partition-varlogaudit-nodev" selected="false" severity="low" weight="5.9">
-          <title>Test if /var/log/audit is mounted with nodev</title>
+          <title>/var/log/audit is mounted with nodev</title>
           <fixtext fixref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_partition-varlogaudit-nodev">Mount /var/log/audit with nodev mount option</fixtext>
           <fix id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_partition-varlogaudit-nodev"
             system="urn:xccdf:fix:system:commands"
@@ -752,7 +813,7 @@ mount -o remount,nodev /var/log/audit
           </check>
         </Rule>
         <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_partition-home-nodev" selected="false" severity="low" weight="5.9">
-          <title>Test if /home is mounted with nodev</title>
+          <title>/home is mounted with nodev</title>
           <fixtext fixref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_partition-home-nodev">Mount /home with nodev mount option</fixtext>
           <fix id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_partition-home-nodev"
             system="urn:xccdf:fix:system:commands"
@@ -766,7 +827,7 @@ mount -o remount,nodev /home
         <!-- Higher severity due to more best practices and world writeable,
              also more likely that exploit of process is done towards /tmp -->
         <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_partition-tmp-nodev" selected="false" severity="medium" weight="5.9">
-          <title>Test if /tmp is mounted with nodev</title>
+          <title>/tmp is mounted with nodev</title>
           <fixtext fixref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_partition-tmp-nodev">Mount /tmp with nodev mount option</fixtext>
           <fix id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_partition-tmp-nodev"
             system="urn:xccdf:fix:system:commands"
@@ -778,7 +839,7 @@ mount -o remount,nodev /tmp
           </check>
         </Rule>
         <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_partition-tmp-nosuid" selected="false" severity="medium" weight="5.9">
-          <title>Test if /tmp is mounted with nosuid</title>
+          <title>/tmp is mounted with nosuid</title>
           <fixtext fixref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_partition-tmp-nosuid">Mount /tmp with nosuid mount option</fixtext>
           <fix id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_partition-tmp-nosuid"
             system="urn:xccdf:fix:system:commands"
@@ -790,7 +851,7 @@ mount -o remount,nosuid /tmp
           </check>
         </Rule>
         <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_partition-home-nosuid" selected="false" severity="low" weight="5.9">
-          <title>Test if /home is mounted with nosuid</title>
+          <title>/home is mounted with nosuid</title>
           <fixtext fixref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_partition-home-nosuid">Mount /home with nosuid mount option</fixtext>
           <fix id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_partition-home-nosuid"
             system="urn:xccdf:fix:system:commands"
@@ -802,7 +863,7 @@ mount -o remount,nosuid /home
           </check>
         </Rule>
         <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_partition-devshm-nosuid" selected="false" severity="medium" weight="5.9">
-          <title>Test if /dev/shm is mounted with nosuid</title>
+          <title>/dev/shm is mounted with nosuid</title>
           <fixtext fixref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_partition-devshm-nosuid">Mount /dev/shm with nosuid mount option</fixtext>
           <fix id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_partition-devshm-nosuid"
             system="urn:xccdf:fix:system:commands"
@@ -816,7 +877,7 @@ mount -o remount,nosuid /dev/shm
         <!-- Weight is 0 as this is a means to exploit, not exploitable by
              itself -->
         <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_partition-tmp-noexec" selected="false" severity="medium" weight="0.0">
-          <title>Test if /tmp is mounted with noexec</title>
+          <title>/tmp is mounted with noexec</title>
           <fixtext fixref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_partition-tmp-noexec">Mount /tmp with noexec mount option</fixtext>
           <fix id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_partition-tmp-noexec"
             system="urn:xccdf:fix:system:commands"
@@ -828,7 +889,7 @@ mount -o remount,noexec /tmp
           </check>
         </Rule>
         <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_partition-devshm-noexec" selected="false" severity="medium" weight="0.0">
-          <title>Test if /dev/shm is mounted with noexec</title>
+          <title>/dev/shm is mounted with noexec</title>
           <fixtext fixref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_partition-devshm-noexec">Mount /dev/shm with nosuid mount option</fixtext>
           <fix id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_partition-devshm-noexec"
             system="urn:xccdf:fix:system:commands"
@@ -843,37 +904,46 @@ mount -o remount,noexec /dev/shm
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-fs-quotas">
         <title>Disk quota support</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           Most file systems support the notion of <h:em>quotas</h:em> - limits
           on the amount of data / files that are allowed on that particular file system.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           To enable quotas, first configure the Linux kernel to include
           <h:code>CONFIG_QUOTA</h:code>.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           Next, install the <h:code>sys-fs/quota</h:code> package.
-          <h:pre># <h:b>emerge quota</h:b></h:pre>
+	  </h:p>
+          <h:pre>
+# <h:b>emerge quota</h:b></h:pre>
+          <h:p>
           Then add <h:code>usrquota</h:code> and <h:code>grpquota</h:code> to
           the partitions (in <h:code>/etc/fstab</h:code>) where quotas need to be
           enabled on. For instance, the following snippet from
           <h:code>/etc/fstab</h:code> enables quotas on <h:code>/var</h:code>
           and <h:code>/home</h:code>.
-          <h:pre>/dev/mapper/volgrp-home  /home  ext4  noatime,nodev,nosuid,<h:b>usrquota,grpquota</h:b>  0 0
-/dev/mapper/volgrp-var   /var   ext4  noatime,<h:b>usrquota,grpquota</h:b>               0 0
-</h:pre>
+	  </h:p>
+          <h:pre>
+/dev/mapper/volgrp-home /home ext4 noatime,nodev,nosuid,<h:b>usrquota,grpquota</h:b> 0 0
+/dev/mapper/volgrp-var  /var  ext4 noatime,<h:b>usrquota,grpquota</h:b>              0 0</h:pre>
+          <h:p>
           Finally, add the <h:code>quota</h:code> service to the boot runlevel.
+	  </h:p>
           <h:pre>
 # <h:b>rc-update add quota boot</h:b></h:pre>
+          <h:p>
           Reboot the system so that the partitions are mounted with the correct
           mount options and that the quota service is running. Then the quotas for
           users and groups can be set up.
+	  </h:p>
         </description>
         <reference
         href="http://www.linuxhomenetworking.com/wiki/index.php/Quick_HOWTO_:_Ch28_:_Managing_Disk_Usage_with_Quotas">Managing
         Disk Usage with Quotas (LinuxHomeNetworking)</reference>
         <reference href="http://www.gentoo.org/doc/en/kernel-config.xml#shorthand">Gentoo Linux Kernel Configuration - shorthand notation information</reference>
         <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_kernel-quota" selected="false" severity="low" weight="1.7">
-          <title>Test if the kernel supports quota (CONFIG_QUOTA)</title>
+          <title>The kernel supports quota (CONFIG_QUOTA)</title>
           <fixtext fixref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_kernel-quota">Rebuild the Linux kernel with quota support (CONFIG_QUOTA)</fixtext>
           <check system="http://oval.mitre.org/XMLSchema/oval-definitions-5">
             <check-content-ref name="oval:org.gentoo.dev.swift:def:18" href="gentoo-oval.xml" />
@@ -884,42 +954,48 @@ mount -o remount,noexec /dev/shm
     <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-services">
       <title>System services</title>
       <description>
+        <h:p>
         Services (daemons) are the primary reason for a server to exist.
         They represent the function of the server. For instance, a web server
         will run the apache2 or lighttpd service. A name server will run the
         named service.
-        <h:br />
-        <h:br />
-        In this benchmark, the focus is on those services that are either
-        default available on a Gentoo installation (like SSHd) or that are 
-        commonly used in Gentoo server architectures (like rsync). For the other
-        services it is wise to consult other hardening guides specific for those
-        services.
+	</h:p>
+	<h:p>
+        In this benchmark, the focus is on a limited set of system services. For
+        the other services it is wise to consult other hardening guides specific
+	for those services.
+	</h:p>
       </description>
       <reference href="http://www.cisecurity.org">Center for Internet Security,
       host of many service benchmarks</reference>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-services-disable">
         <title>Disable unsafe services</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           It is recommended to disable (or even uninstall) the following services unless
           absolutely necessary. These services use plain-text protocols and are as such unsafe
           to use on (untrusted) networks.
+	  </h:p>
           <h:ul>
             <h:li>Telnet service</h:li>
             <h:li>FTP Service</h:li>
           </h:ul>
-          <h:br />
+	  <h:p>
           It is recommended to substitute these services with their more secure
           counterparts (like sFTP, SSH, ...).
+	  </h:p>
         </description>
         <!-- Max score: password in clear text and your system is compromised (if it is root) -->
 	<Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_telnetd-notrunning" selected="false" severity="high" weight="10.0">
-          <title>Test if no telnet daemons are running</title>
+          <title>No telnet daemons are running</title>
           <fixtext fixref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_telnetd-notrunning">Stop telnet services</fixtext>
           <fix id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_telnetd-notrunning"
             system="urn:xccdf:fix:system:commands"
             platform="cpe:/o:gentoo:linux" complexity="low" disruption="high" reboot="false">
-for service in /etc/init.d/*telnet*; do test -f ${service} &amp;&amp; run_init rc-service ${service##*/} stop; done
+for service in /etc/init.d/*telnet*;
+do
+  test -f ${service} &amp;&amp; run_init rc-service ${service##*/} stop;
+done
           </fix>
           <check system="http://oval.mitre.org/XMLSchema/oval-definitions-5">
             <check-content-ref name="oval:org.gentoo.dev.swift:def:19" href="gentoo-oval.xml" />
@@ -927,12 +1003,15 @@ for service in /etc/init.d/*telnet*; do test -f ${service} &amp;&amp; run_init r
         </Rule>
         <!-- Partial breach, assuming accounts are not system accounts -->
         <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_ftpd-notrunning" selected="false" severity="medium" weight="7.5">
-          <title>Test if no FTP daemons are running</title>
+          <title>No FTP daemons are running</title>
           <fixtext fixref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_ftpd-notrunning">Stop FTPd services</fixtext>
           <fix id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_ftpd-notrunning"
             system="urn:xccdf:fix:system:commands"
             platform="cpe:/o:gentoo:linux" complexity="low" disruption="high" reboot="false">
-for service in /etc/init.d/*ftp*; do test -f ${service} &amp;&amp; run_init rc-service ${service##*/} stop; done
+for service in /etc/init.d/*ftp*;
+do
+  test -f ${service} &amp;&amp; run_init rc-service ${service##*/} stop;
+done
           </fix>
           <check system="http://oval.mitre.org/XMLSchema/oval-definitions-5">
             <check-content-ref name="oval:org.gentoo.dev.swift:def:20" href="gentoo-oval.xml" />
@@ -942,26 +1021,29 @@ for service in /etc/init.d/*ftp*; do test -f ${service} &amp;&amp; run_init rc-s
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-services-sulogin">
         <title>Require single-user boot to give root password</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           When a system is booted in single user mode, some users might find it
           handy to immediately get a root prompt; many even have a specific
           bootloader entry to boot in single user mode.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           It is important that, for a more secure server environment, even
           booting in single user mode requires the user to enter the root
           password. This is already done by default in Gentoo through the
           <h:code>rc_shell</h:code> variable in <h:code>/etc/rc.conf</h:code>.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           Administrators should also make sure that no direct shells are provided
           in <h:code>/etc/inittab</h:code> for single-user mode. Gentoo's
           <h:code>/etc/inittab</h:code> definition should look like so:
-          <h:pre>su0:S:wait:/sbin/rc single
+	  </h:p>
+          <h:pre>
+su0:S:wait:/sbin/rc single
 <h:b>su1:S:wait:/sbin/sulogin</h:b></h:pre>
         </description>
         <!-- CVSS2: AV:L/AC:H/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C (high attack complexity due to console access) -->
         <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_rcconf-sulogin" selected="false" severity="medium" weight="6.0">
-          <title>Test if sulogin is used for single-user boot (/etc/rc.conf)</title>
+          <title>sulogin is used for single-user boot (/etc/rc.conf)</title>
           <fixtext fixref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_rcconf-sulogin">Set /sbin/sulogin for rc_shell</fixtext>
           <fix id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_rcconf-sulogin"
             system="urn:xccdf:fix:system:commands"
@@ -973,7 +1055,7 @@ sed -i -e 's:^rc_shell=.*:rc_shell="/sbin/sulogin":g' /etc/rc.conf
           </check>
         </Rule>
         <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_inittab-sulogin" selected="false" severity="medium" weight="6.0">
-          <title>Test if sulogin is used for single-user boot (/etc/inittab)</title>
+          <title>sulogin is used for single-user boot (/etc/inittab)</title>
           <fixtext fixref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_inittab-sulogin">
             Set /sbin/sulogin or '/sbin/rc single' for single-user boot in /etc/inittab
           </fixtext>
@@ -981,23 +1063,24 @@ sed -i -e 's:^rc_shell=.*:rc_shell="/sbin/sulogin":g' /etc/rc.conf
             <check-content-ref name="oval:org.gentoo.dev.swift:def:22" href="gentoo-oval.xml" />
           </check>
         </Rule>
-
       </Group>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-services-tcpwrappers">
         <title>Properly Configure TCP Wrappers</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           With TCP wrappers, services that support TCP wrappers (or those
           started through <h:b>xinetd</h:b>) should be configured to only accept
           communication with trusted hosts. With the use of
           <h:code>/etc/hosts.allow</h:code> and <h:code>/etc/hosts.deny</h:code>,
           proper access control lists can be created.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           More information on the format of these files can be obtained through
           <h:b>man 5 hosts_access</h:b>.
+	  </h:p>
         </description>
         <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_hostsallow-exists" selected="false" severity="info" weight="0.0">
-          <title>Tests if /etc/hosts.allow exists</title>
+          <title>/etc/hosts.allow exists</title>
           <fixtext fixref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_hostsallow-exists">
             Create and properly configure /etc/hosts.allow
           </fixtext>
@@ -1009,12 +1092,14 @@ sed -i -e 's:^rc_shell=.*:rc_shell="/sbin/sulogin":g' /etc/rc.conf
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-services-ssh">
         <title>SSH service</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           The SSH service is used for secure remote access towards a system, but
           also to provide secure file transfers. It is very commonly found on Unix/Linux
           systems so proper hardening is definitely in place.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           Please use the "Hardening OpenSSH" guide for the necessary instructions.
+	  </h:p>
         </description>
       </Group>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-services-cron">
@@ -1026,17 +1111,19 @@ sed -i -e 's:^rc_shell=.*:rc_shell="/sbin/sulogin":g' /etc/rc.conf
         <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-services-cron-acl">
           <title>Only allow trusted accounts cron access</title>
           <description>
+	    <h:p>
             Only allow trusted accounts to use cron. How to achieve this depends on the cron service
             installed.
-            <h:br />
-            <h:br />
-            If vixie-cron is installed, then have (only) those users that need cron access take part in the
-            <h:em>cron</h:em> unix group. 
-            <h:br />
-            <h:br />
+	    </h:p>
+	    <h:p>
+            If vixie-cron or cronie is installed, then have (only) those users that need cron access
+	    take part in the <h:em>cron</h:em> unix group. 
+	    </h:p>
+	    <h:p>
             If dcron is used, then make sure <h:code>/usr/sbin/crontab</h:code> is only executable by
             root and the cron unix group, and make sure (only) those users that need cron access take part
             in the <h:em>cron</h:em> unix group.
+	    </h:p>
           </description>
         </Group>
       </Group>
@@ -1050,17 +1137,19 @@ sed -i -e 's:^rc_shell=.*:rc_shell="/sbin/sulogin":g' /etc/rc.conf
         <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-services-at-acl">
           <title>Only allow trusted accounts at access</title>
           <description>
+	    <h:p>
             Only allow trusted accounts to use at. Unlike cron access, at access is governed through
             the <h:code>/etc/at/at.allow</h:code> file. If the <h:code>at.allow</h:code> file does not
             exist but <h:code>/etc/at/at.deny</h:code> does, then all names <h:em>not</h:em> mentioned in
             the file are allowed to run at. The most secure method is to use the <h:code>at.allow</h:code>
             method.
-            <h:br />
-            <h:br />
+	    </h:p>
+	    <h:p>
             The format of these files is one username per line.
+	    </h:p>
           </description>
           <Rule id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_rule_atallow-exists" selected="false" severity="low" weight="0.0">
-            <title>Tests if /etc/at/at.allow exists</title>
+            <title>/etc/at/at.allow exists</title>
             <fixtext fixref="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_fix_atsallow-exists">
               Create and properly configure /etc/at/at.allow
             </fixtext>
@@ -1073,21 +1162,25 @@ sed -i -e 's:^rc_shell=.*:rc_shell="/sbin/sulogin":g' /etc/rc.conf
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-services-ntp">
         <title>NTP service</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           With NTP, systems can synchronise their clocks, ensuring correct date
           and time information. This is important as huge clock drift could
           cause misinterpretation of log files or even unwanted execution of
           commands.
+	  </h:p>
         </description>
         <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-services-ntp-sync">
           <title>Synchronise the system clock</title>
           <description>
+	    <h:p>
             Synchronise the systems' clock with an authorative NTP server, and
             use the same NTP service for all other systems.
-            <h:br />
-            <h:br />
+	    </h:p>
+	    <h:p>
             This can be accomplished by regularly executing <h:b>ntpdate</h:b>,
             but can also be handled using a service like <h:code>net-misc/ntp</h:code>'s
             <h:b>ntpd</h:b>.
+	    </h:p>
           </description>
         </Group>
       </Group>
@@ -1095,25 +1188,29 @@ sed -i -e 's:^rc_shell=.*:rc_shell="/sbin/sulogin":g' /etc/rc.conf
     <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-portage">
       <title>Portage settings</title>
       <description>
+        <h:p>
         The package manager of any system is a very important tool. It is
         responsible for handling proper software deployments, but also offers
         features that should not be neglected, like security patch roll-out.
-        <h:br />
-        <h:br />
+	</h:p>
+	<h:p>
         For Gentoo, the package manager offers a great deal of flexibility (as
         that is the goal of Gentoo anyhow). As such, good settings for a more
         secure environment within Portage (assuming that Portage is used as
         package manager) are important.
+	</h:p>
       </description>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-portage-use">
         <title>USE flags</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           USE flags in Gentoo are used to tune the functionality of many
           components and enable or disable features.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           For a well secured environment, there are a couple of USE flags that
           should be set in a global manner. These USE flags are
+	  </h:p>
           <h:ul>
             <h:li>
               <h:code>pam</h:code> to enable Pluggable Authentication
@@ -1126,43 +1223,51 @@ sed -i -e 's:^rc_shell=.*:rc_shell="/sbin/sulogin":g' /etc/rc.conf
               <h:code>ssl</h:code> for SSL/TLS support
             </h:li>
           </h:ul>
+	  <h:p>
           <h:b>Pluggable Authentication Modules</h:b> are a powerful mechanism
           to manage authentication, authorization and user sessions.
           Applications that support PAM can be tuned to the liking of the
           organization, leveraging central authentication, password policies,
           auditing and more.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           With <h:b>TCP wrappers</h:b>, services can be shielded from
           unauthorized access on host level. It is an access control level
           mechanism which allows configuring allowed (and denied) hosts or
           network segments on application level.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           Finally, leveraging <h:b>Secure Sockets Layer</h:b> (or the
           standardized <h:b>Transport Layer Security</h:b>) allows applications
           to encrypt network communication or even implement a
           client-certificate based authentication mechanism.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           Set the USE flags globally in <h:code>/etc/portage/make.conf</h:code>
           so they are applicable to all installed software.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:pre>USE="... pam tcpd ssl"</h:pre>
+	  </h:p>
+          <h:pre>
+USE="... pam tcpd ssl"</h:pre>
         </description>
       </Group>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-portage-webrsync">
         <title>Fetching signed portage tree</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           Gentoo Portage supports fetching signed tree snapshots using
           <h:b>emerge-webrsync</h:b>. This is documented in the Gentoo Handbook,
           but as it is quite easy, here are the instructions again:
-          <h:pre># <h:b>mkdir -p /etc/portage/gpg</h:b>
+	  </h:p>
+          <h:pre>
+# <h:b>mkdir -p /etc/portage/gpg</h:b>
 # <h:b>chmod 0700 /etc/portage/gpg</h:b>
-# <h:b>gpg --homedir /etc/portage/gpg --keyserver subkeys.pgp.net --recv-keys 0x239C75C4 0x96D8BF6D</h:b>
-# <h:b>gpg --homedir /etc/portage/gpg --edit-key 0x239C75C4 trust</h:b>
-# <h:b>gpg --homedir /etc/portage/gpg --edit-key 0x96D8BF6D trust</h:b></h:pre>
+# <h:b>export SRV="subkeys.pgp.net"</h:b>
+# <h:b>export KEY="0x96D8BF6D"</h:b>
+# <h:b>gpg --homedir /etc/portage/gpg --keyserver ${SRV} --recv-keys ${KEY}</h:b>
+# <h:b>gpg --homedir /etc/portage/gpg --edit-key ${KEY} trust</h:b></h:pre>
+          <h:p>
           After this, edit <h:code>/etc/portage/make.conf</h:code>:
+	  </h:p>
           <h:pre>
 FEATURES="webrsync-gpg"
 PORTAGE_GPG_DIR="/etc/portage/gpg"
@@ -1173,37 +1278,44 @@ SYNC=""</h:pre>
     <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-kernel">
       <title>Kernel configuration</title>
       <description>
+        <h:p>
         The Linux kernel should be configured using a sane security standard in
         mind. When using grSecurity, additional security-enhancing settings can
         be enabled.
-        <h:br />
-        <h:br />
+	</h:p>
+	<h:p>
         For further details, please refer to the "Hardening the Linux kernel" guide.
+	</h:p>
       </description>
       <reference href="http://www.gentoo.org/doc/en/kernel-config.xml#shorthand">Gentoo Kernel Configuration Guide - Shorthand notation information</reference>
     </Group>
     <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-bootloader">
       <title>Bootloader configuration</title>
       <description>
+        <h:p>
         The bootloader (be it GRUB or another tool) is responsible for loading
         the Linux kernel and handing over system control to the kernel. But boot
         loaders also allow for a flexible approach on kernel loading, which can
         be (ab)used to work around security mechanisms.
+	</h:p>
       </description>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-bootloader-grub1pass">
         <title>Password protect GRUB (legacy)</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           It is recommended to password-protect the GRUB configuration so that
           the boot options cannot be modified during a boot without providing the
           valid password.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           This can be accomplished by inserting <h:code>password abc123</h:code>
           in <h:code>/boot/grub/grub.conf</h:code> (which will set the password
           to "abc123"). But as clear-text passwords in the configuration file are insecure as well,
           hash the passwords. Just start <h:b>grub</h:b>
           and, in the grub-shell, type <h:b>md5crypt</h:b>.
-          <h:pre># <h:b>grub</h:b>
+	  </h:p>
+          <h:pre>
+# <h:b>grub</h:b>
 
 GRUB version 0.92 (640K lower / 3072K upper memory)
 
@@ -1215,25 +1327,28 @@ Password: <h:em>abc123</h:em>
 Encrypted: $1$18u.M0$J8VbOsGXuoG9Fh3n7ZkqY.
 
 grub&gt; <h:b>quit</h:b></h:pre>
-          <h:br />
+          <h:p>
           This hashed password can now be used in <h:code>grub.conf</h:code>
           using <h:code>password --md5 $1$18u.M0$J8VbOsGXuoG9Fh3n7ZkqY.</h:code>.
+	  </h:p>
         </description>
       </Group>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-bootloader-lilopass">
         <title>Password protect LILO</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           It is recommended to password-protect the LILO configuration so that
           modifying the boot options during a boot without providing the
           valid password is not possible.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           This can be accomplished  by inserting <h:code>password=abc123</h:code>
           followed by <h:code>restricted</h:code> in the
           <h:code>/etc/lilo.conf</h:code> file. It is also possible to do this
           on a per-image level.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:pre>password=abc123
+	  </h:p>
+          <h:pre>
+password=abc123
 restricted
 delay=3
 
@@ -1241,40 +1356,46 @@ image=/boot/bzImage
         read-only
         password=def456
         restricted</h:pre>
-           <h:br />
+	   <h:p>
            The <h:code>restricted</h:code> keyword is needed to have LILO only
            ask for the password if a modification is given. If the defaults are
            used, then no password needs to be provided.
-           <h:br />
-           <h:br />
+	   </h:p>
+	   <h:p>
            Rerun <h:code>lilo</h:code> after updating the configuration file.
+	   </h:p>
         </description>
       </Group>
     </Group>
     <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-auth">
       <title>Authentication and authorization settings</title>
       <description>
+        <h:p>
         An important part in a servers' security is its authentication and
         authorization support. We have already described how to build in PAM
         support (through the Portage USE flags), but proper authentication and
         authorization settings are mode than just compiling in the necessary
         functionality.
+	</h:p>
       </description>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-auth-securetty">
         <title>Restrict root system logon</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           To restrict where the root user can directly log on, edit
           <h:code>/etc/securetty</h:code> and specify the supported terminals
           for the root user.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           When properly configured, any attempt to log on as the root user from
           a non-defined terminal will result in logon failure.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           A recommended setting is to only allow root user login through the
           console and the physical terminals (<h:code>tty0-tty12</h:code>).
-          <h:pre>console
+	  </h:p>
+          <h:pre>
+console
 tty0
 tty1
 ...
@@ -1284,30 +1405,34 @@ tty12</h:pre>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-auth-userlogin">
         <title>Allow only known users to login</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           When PAM is enabled, the <h:code>/etc/security/access.conf</h:code>
           file is used to check which users are allowed to log on and not
           (through the <h:b>login</h:b> application). These limits are based on
           username, group and host, network or tty that the user is trying to
           log on from.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           By enabling these settings, the risk is reduced that a functional
           account (say <h:code>apache</h:code>) is abused to log on with, or
           that a new account is created as part of an exploit.
+	  </h:p>
         </description>
       </Group>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-auth-resources">
         <title>Restrict user resources</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           When facing a DoS (Denial-of-Service) attack, reducing the impact of
           the attack can be done by limited resource consumption. Although the
           component that is under attack will even more quickly fail, the impact
           towards the other services on the system (including remote logon to
           fix things) is more limited.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           In Gentoo Linux, the following methods are available to limit
           resources.
+	  </h:p>
           <h:ul>
             <h:li>
               <h:code>/etc/security/limits.conf</h:code> defines the
@@ -1320,17 +1445,19 @@ tty12</h:pre>
               PAM-aware.
             </h:li>
           </h:ul>
+	  <h:p>
           Generally, it should suffice to set up
           <h:code>/etc/security/limits.conf</h:code>, which is the configuration
           file used by the <h:code>pam_limits.so</h:code> module.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           Note that the settings are applicable on a <h:em>per login
           session</h:em> basis.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           More information on these files and their syntax can be obtained
           through their manual pages.
+	  </h:p>
           <h:pre>
 # <h:b>man limits.conf</h:b>
 # <h:b>man limits</h:b></h:pre>
@@ -1339,71 +1466,84 @@ tty12</h:pre>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-auth-password">
         <title>Enforce password policy</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           Usually most organizations have a password policy, telling their users
           how long their passwords should be and how often the passwords should
           be changed. Most users see this as an annoying aspect, so it might be
           best to enforce this policy.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           Enforcing password policies is (partially) part of the
           <h:code>sys-apps/shadow</h:code> package (which is installed by
           default) and can be configured through the
           <h:code>/etc/login.defs</h:code> file. This file is well documented
           (using comments) and it has a full manual page as well.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           A second important player when dealing with password policies is the
           <h:code>pam_cracklib.so</h:code> library. This can be used in the
           appropriate <h:code>/etc/pam.d/*</h:code> files. For instance, for the
           <h:code>/etc/pam.d/passwd</h:code> definition:
-          <h:pre>auth      required pam_unix.so shadow nullok
-account   required pam_unix.so
-<h:b>password  required pam_cracklib.so difok=3 retry=3 minlen=8 dcredit=-2 ocredit=-2</h:b>
-password  required pam_unix.so md5 use_authok
-session   required pam_unix.so</h:pre>
+	  </h:p>
+          <h:pre>
+auth     required pam_unix.so shadow nullok
+account  required pam_unix.so
+<h:b>password required pam_cracklib.so difok=3 retry=3 \
+                                  minlen=8 dcredit=-2 \
+				  ocredit=-2</h:b>
+password required pam_unix.so md5 use_authok
+session  required pam_unix.so</h:pre>
+          <h:p>
           In the above example, the password is required to be at least 8
           characters long, differ more than 3 characters from the previous
           password, contain 2 digits and 2 non-alphanumeric characters.
+	  </h:p>
         </description>
       </Group>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-auth-ripper">
         <title>Review password strength regularly</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           Regularly check the strength of the users' passwords. There are tools
           out there, like <h:code>app-crypt/johntheripper</h:code> which, given
           a <h:code>/etc/shadow</h:code> file (or sometimes even LDAP dump) try
           to find the passwords for the users.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           When such a tool can guess a users' password, that users' password
           should be expired and the user should be notified and asked to change
           his password.
+	  </h:p>
         </description>
       </Group>
     </Group>
     <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-session">
       <title>Session settings</title>
       <description>
+        <h:p>
         Unlike authentication and authorization settings, a <h:em>session</h:em>
         setting is one that is applicable to an authenticated and authorized
         user when he is logged on to the system.
+	</h:p>
       </description>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-session-mesg">
         <title>Disable access to user terminals</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           By default, user terminals are accessible by others to write messages
           to (using <h:b>write</h:b>, <h:b>wall</h:b> or <h:b>talk</h:b>). It is
           adviseable to disable this unless explicitly necessary.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           Messages can confuse users and trick them into performing malicious
           actions. 
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           This can be disabled by setting <h:code>mesg n</h:code> in
           <h:code>/etc/profile</h:code>. A user-friendly method for doing so in
           Gentoo is to create a file <h:code>/etc/profile.d/disable_mesg</h:code> which
           contains this command.
+	  </h:p>
         </description>
       </Group>
     </Group>
@@ -1417,37 +1557,44 @@ session   required pam_unix.so</h:pre>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-fileprivileges-worldrw">
         <title>Limit world writable files and locations</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           Limit (or even remove) the use of world writable files and locations.
           If a directory is world writable, it makes sense to have the
           sticky bit set on it as well (like with <h:code>/tmp</h:code>).
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           Use <h:code>find</h:code> to locate such files or directories.
-          <h:pre># <h:b>find / -perm +o=w ! \( -type d -perm +o=t \) ! -type l -print</h:b></h:pre>
+	  </h:p>
+          <h:pre>
+# <h:b>find / -perm +o=w ! \( -type d -perm +o=t \) ! -type l -print</h:b></h:pre>
+          <h:p>
           The above command shows world writable files and locations, unless it
           is a directory with the sticky bit set, or a symbolic link (whose
           world writable privilege is not accessible anyhow).
+	  </h:p>
         </description>
       </Group>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-fileprivileges-suidsgid">
         <title>Limit setuid and setgid file and directory usage</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           The <h:em>setuid</h:em> and <h:em>setgid</h:em> flags for files and
           directories can be used to work around authentication and
           authorization measures taken on the system. So their use should be
           carefully guarded.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           In case of files, the setuid or setgid bit causes the application (if
           the file is marked as executable) to run with the privileges of the
           file owner (setuid) or group owner (setgid). It is necessary for
           applications that need elevated privileges, like <h:b>su</h:b> or
           <h:b>sudo</h:b>.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           In case of directories, the setgit bit causes newly created
           files in that directory to automatically be owned by the same group as
           the mentioned (parent) directory.
+	  </h:p>
         </description>
       </Group>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-fileprivileges-logs">
@@ -1463,12 +1610,14 @@ session   required pam_unix.so</h:pre>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_system-fileprivileges-rootonly">
         <title>Files only used by root should be root-only</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           Some files, like <h:code>/etc/shadow</h:code>, are meant to be read
           (and perhaps modified) by root only. These files should never have
           privileges for group- or others.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           A nonexhaustive list of such files is:
+	  </h:p>
           <h:ul>
             <h:li>
               <h:code>/etc/shadow</h:code> which contains account password
@@ -1508,13 +1657,15 @@ session   required pam_unix.so</h:pre>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_data-backup-automate">
         <title>Automated backups</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           Automate backups on the system. If the backups are performed manually
           then they are done wrong and someone will eventually forget it.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           Use scheduling software like <h:code>cron</h:code> to
           automatically take backups on regular intervals, or use a central
           backup solution like <h:code>bacula</h:code>.
+	  </h:p>
         </description>
       </Group>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_data-backups-coverage">
@@ -1529,18 +1680,20 @@ session   required pam_unix.so</h:pre>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_data-backups-history">
         <title>Retention</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           Ensure that the backups use a long enough retention. It is not wise
           to take a single backup and overwrite this one over and over again, as
           there will be a time that a file needs to be recovered that was corrupted
           long before the last backup was taken.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           There is no perfect retention period however, as the more backups are 
           kept, the more storage is required and the more money or time needs to be invested in
           managing the backups.
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           In most cases, introduce a "layered" approach on retention. For instance:
+	  </h:p>
           <h:ul>
             <h:li>keep daily backups for a week</h:li>
             <h:li>
@@ -1558,15 +1711,17 @@ session   required pam_unix.so</h:pre>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_data-backups-location">
         <title>Off-site backups</title>
         <description>
+	  <h:p>
           Keep the backups off-site in case of disaster. But consider this
           location carefully. Investigate how fast the backup can be put there,
           but also how fast it can be retrieved it in case of need. Also investigate if this
           location is juridically sane (is it allowed to put the data on this location
           and is this off-site location trusted).
-          <h:br />
-          <h:br />
+	  </h:p>
+	  <h:p>
           Also ensure that the backups are stored securely. If necessary,
           encrypt the backups.
+	  </h:p>
         </description>
       </Group>
       <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_data-backups-validate">
@@ -1588,16 +1743,18 @@ session   required pam_unix.so</h:pre>
     <Group id="xccdf_org.gentoo.dev.swift_group_removal-wipedisk">
       <title>Wipe disks</title>
       <description>
+        <h:p>
         Clear all data from the disks on the server in a secure manner.
         Applications like <h:b>shred</h:b> (part of
         <h:code>sys-apps/coreutils</h:code>) can be used to security wipe data
         or even entire partitions or disks.
-        <h:br />
-        <h:br />
+	</h:p>
+	<h:p>
         It is recommended to perform full disk wipes rather than file wipes.
         If this needs to be done on file level, see if the file system
         journaling can be disabled during the wipe session as journaling might "buffer" the
         secure writes and only write the end result to the disk.
+	</h:p>
       </description>
       <reference href="http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-88/NISTSP800-88_rev1.pdf">NIST Publication "Guidelines for Media Sanitization" (PDF)</reference>
     </Group>