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authorMiss Islington (bot) <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>2021-03-29 08:39:05 -0700
committerMichał Górny <mgorny@gentoo.org>2021-04-03 01:25:34 +0200
commitbb1a82b7dd85ba73c94f0448611e59e8b8835f00 (patch)
treeaea77fc1a0429bf5ea53ae44f6a0960c80e1a9e0
parent[3.7] bpo-43285 Make ftplib not trust the PASV response. (GH-24838) (GH-24881... (diff)
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bpo-42988: Remove the pydoc getfile feature (GH-25015) (#25066)gentoo-3.7.10_p1
CVE-2021-3426: Remove the "getfile" feature of the pydoc module which could be abused to read arbitrary files on the disk (directory traversal vulnerability). Moreover, even source code of Python modules can contain sensitive data like passwords. Vulnerability reported by David Schwörer. (cherry picked from commit 9b999479c0022edfc9835a8a1f06e046f3881048) Co-authored-by: Victor Stinner <vstinner@python.org> Co-authored-by: Victor Stinner <vstinner@python.org>
-rw-r--r--Lib/pydoc.py18
-rw-r--r--Lib/test/test_pydoc.py6
-rw-r--r--Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2021-03-24-14-16-56.bpo-42988.P2aNco.rst4
3 files changed, 4 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/Lib/pydoc.py b/Lib/pydoc.py
index 978e4cd0baa..9677c0d0468 100644
--- a/Lib/pydoc.py
+++ b/Lib/pydoc.py
@@ -2348,9 +2348,6 @@ def _url_handler(url, content_type="text/html"):
%s</head><body bgcolor="#f0f0f8">%s<div style="clear:both;padding-top:.5em;">%s</div>
</body></html>''' % (title, css_link, html_navbar(), contents)
- def filelink(self, url, path):
- return '<a href="getfile?key=%s">%s</a>' % (url, path)
-
html = _HTMLDoc()
@@ -2436,19 +2433,6 @@ def _url_handler(url, content_type="text/html"):
'key = %s' % key, '#ffffff', '#ee77aa', '<br>'.join(results))
return 'Search Results', contents
- def html_getfile(path):
- """Get and display a source file listing safely."""
- path = urllib.parse.unquote(path)
- with tokenize.open(path) as fp:
- lines = html.escape(fp.read())
- body = '<pre>%s</pre>' % lines
- heading = html.heading(
- '<big><big><strong>File Listing</strong></big></big>',
- '#ffffff', '#7799ee')
- contents = heading + html.bigsection(
- 'File: %s' % path, '#ffffff', '#ee77aa', body)
- return 'getfile %s' % path, contents
-
def html_topics():
"""Index of topic texts available."""
@@ -2540,8 +2524,6 @@ def _url_handler(url, content_type="text/html"):
op, _, url = url.partition('=')
if op == "search?key":
title, content = html_search(url)
- elif op == "getfile?key":
- title, content = html_getfile(url)
elif op == "topic?key":
# try topics first, then objects.
try:
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_pydoc.py b/Lib/test/test_pydoc.py
index 198cea93eb5..baad8212c57 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_pydoc.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_pydoc.py
@@ -1049,18 +1049,12 @@ class PydocUrlHandlerTest(PydocBaseTest):
("topic?key=def", "Pydoc: KEYWORD def"),
("topic?key=STRINGS", "Pydoc: TOPIC STRINGS"),
("foobar", "Pydoc: Error - foobar"),
- ("getfile?key=foobar", "Pydoc: Error - getfile?key=foobar"),
]
with self.restrict_walk_packages():
for url, title in requests:
self.call_url_handler(url, title)
- path = string.__file__
- title = "Pydoc: getfile " + path
- url = "getfile?key=" + path
- self.call_url_handler(url, title)
-
class TestHelper(unittest.TestCase):
def test_keywords(self):
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2021-03-24-14-16-56.bpo-42988.P2aNco.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2021-03-24-14-16-56.bpo-42988.P2aNco.rst
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..4b42dd05305
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2021-03-24-14-16-56.bpo-42988.P2aNco.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+CVE-2021-3426: Remove the ``getfile`` feature of the :mod:`pydoc` module which
+could be abused to read arbitrary files on the disk (directory traversal
+vulnerability). Moreover, even source code of Python modules can contain
+sensitive data like passwords. Vulnerability reported by David Schwörer.